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Abstract 
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) refers to safeguarding essential services from harm. CIP has 
gained recognition as a priority area on the national security agendas of many countries in recent years, 
most notably Australia, due to events that have compromised the critical infrastructure (CI) of other 
nations. The importance of the CIP process is evidenced extensively in the related literature, where the 
major phases of the process are discussed. Traditionally, the CIP focus is on the three major stages of 
vulnerability identification, risk assessment and risk management. A study conducted by Breeding in 2003 
introduced the risk of ‘sensitive but unclassified’ data to America’s infrastructure, viewing the threat on 
CIP from an alternative viewpoint. ‘Sensitive but unclassified’ data refers to information that may not on 
its own appear harmful but when amalgamated with additional data elements can be truly revealing about 
CI, thus posing a threat to CIP. This study adapts Breeding’s research to an Australian setting, in an 
attempt to determine the threat of public data availability on the CIP process in Australia. The 
methodology involved an observational study on the nature of the public data availability situation 
through a structured public data collection process, an evaluation of data protection mechanisms using a 
content analysis, and a survey of security experts in Australia. The ultimate objective of the study was to 
attempt to provide a solution to the censorship versus open information access debate, which is 
presently a prominent dilemma. That is, should certain CI-related information be restricted from the public 
arena in the interest of national security? The outcomes of the public data collection phase, the content 
and the survey revealed that a balance between open data access and restriction is required, supporting 
the existing view in the reviewed literature. A Stakeholder Matrix was devised as a crucial component of 
public data protection, providing a sensitivity-based grading system. Additionally, a structured approach in 
the form of the Public Data Protection Lifecycle was proposed, which recognised that current security 
mechanisms (primarily written documentation) do not offer adequate protection for CI-related public 
data. A comprehensive, and multi-faceted approach is required, which considers the Stakeholder Matrix, 
current written documentation (licence agreements), and technical security mechanisms as instrumental 
to protecting public data from potential misuse, and ensuring that the threat of public data availability on 
the CIP process, and Australia’s CI is minimised. 
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Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) refers to safeguarding essential services from harm. 
CIP has gained recognition as a priority area on the national security agendas of many 
countries in recent years, most notably Australia, due to events that have compromised the 
critical infrastructure (CI) of other nations. The importance of the CIP process is evidenced 
extensively in the related literature, where the major phases of the process are discussed. 
Traditionally, the CIP focus is on the three major stages of vulnerability identification, risk 
assessment and risk management. A study conducted by Breeding in 2003 introduced the risk 
of ‘sensitive but unclassified’ data to America’s infrastructure, viewing the threat on CIP 
from an alternative viewpoint. ‘Sensitive but unclassified’ data refers to information that may 
not on its own appear harmful but when amalgamated with additional data elements can be 
truly revealing about CI, thus posing a threat to CIP. This study adapts Breeding’s research to 
an Australian setting, in an attempt to determine the threat of public data availability on the 
CIP process in Australia.  
 
The methodology involved an observational study on the nature of the public data availability 
situation through a structured public data collection process, an evaluation of data protection 
mechanisms using a content analysis, and a survey of security experts in Australia. The 
ultimate objective of the study was to attempt to provide a solution to the censorship versus 
open information access debate, which is presently a prominent dilemma. That is, should 
certain CI-related information be restricted from the public arena in the interest of national 
security? 
 
The outcomes of the public data collection phase, the content and the survey revealed that a 
balance between open data access and restriction is required, supporting the existing view in 
the reviewed literature. A Stakeholder Matrix was devised as a crucial component of public 
data protection, providing a sensitivity-based grading system. Additionally, a structured 
approach in the form of the Public Data Protection Lifecycle was proposed, which recognised 
that current security mechanisms (primarily written documentation) do not offer adequate 
protection for CI-related public data. A comprehensive, and multi-faceted approach is 
required, which considers the Stakeholder Matrix, current written documentation (licence 
agreements), and technical security mechanisms as instrumental to protecting public data 
from potential misuse, and ensuring that the threat of public data availability on the CIP 
process, and Australia’s CI is minimised. 
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This study examines the threat of freely available information on critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP) efforts, measuring the amount of information available for 
public use, the existing security techniques to government information use, and the extent to 
which security experts in Australia are conscious of resultant consequences.  
 
Critical infrastructures (CI) are the essential services that contribute to the stability 
and security of a country (Chakrabarty and Mendonca, 2004; Rinaldi et. al., 2001). A 
comprehensive listing of critical infrastructure includes energy, banking/finance, water 
related, transportation, agriculture, health and emergency, information and communications, 
storage and transportation, government, law and order, and cultural services (Breeding, 2003; 
Chakrabarty and Mendonca, 2004; Scholand et. al. 2005). A standard, global definition of 
critical infrastructure is not available; rather, each respective country determines the critical 
categories independently. 
 
Critical infrastructure protection refers to safeguarding the identified services from 
potential harm, including physical and/or electronic attacks (ASIO, 2006).  Although minor 
variations exist regarding the specific phases of the CIP process, it is widely agreed that the 
typical steps encompass vulnerability assessment/scanning, risk assessment, and risk 
management (Luiijf and Klaver, 2004; Jones et. al., 2003), as shown in Figure 1.1. The CIP 
process is a crucial consideration today, particularly due to the prevalence of national security 









Figure 1.1 The Basic Critical Infrastructure Protection Process 
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CIP has been a global concern since the Cold War. However, the issue has gained 
increased exposure in Australia since the incidents of Y2K, September 11, 2001 and Bali, 
2002 (Luiijf and Klaver, 2004; Emergency Management Australia, 2003). 
 
Additionally, the importance and increased use of the Internet and Information and 
Communication Technologies (such as biometrics, database processing, geospatial 
information exploitation, video processing and visualisations) have amplified the risks on 
critical infrastructures (Popp et. al., 2004). These technologies provide outlets for 
data/information exchange, and have simplified the ability to transmit data. Of particular 
importance to this research is the exchange of ‘sensitive but unclassified’ public data. This 
refers to information that may be unclassified when used independently, but when combined 
enables inferences or previously unconsidered patterns to emerge, which may prove harmful 
(Thuraisingham, n.d.). 
 
 An introductory study into the consequences of public data availability on critical 
infrastructure states that there is an increase in the education levels of the individuals/groups 
attempting to penetrate critical services (Breeding, 2003). In particular, their use of 
technologies, and the availability of certain tools, has become progressively sophisticated, 
allowing room for the collection, use and duplication of information. These concepts are 
supported by authors such as Weinmann (2006), who asserts that the Internet offers a vast 
repository of data that may potentially be exploited, and be used to compromise the CIP 
process, and consequently undermine national security.  
 
The amalgamation of the abovementioned factors has resulted in, or prompted the 
need for national security to become a major global concern.  
 
1.3 Relevance of Research 
There are four primary sources of justification for this current study, including: 
1. The recognised need for CIP, and national security research; 
2. The lack of consideration for public data availability in Australia, with respect to the 
CIP process;  
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3. The escalating (and somewhat neglected) public data availability situation that 
currently exists; and 
4. The interest expressed in the study by a number of Australian agencies. 
 
The need for critical infrastructure protection, and national security is recognised and 
supported by Government and research bodies throughout Australia (and internationally). For 
example, the Australian Research Council (ARC) lists critical infrastructure protection as one 
of the major ‘Priority Areas for ARC Funding 2005-2006’ (ARC, 2006). Additionally, the 
Research Network for a Secure Australia identifies threat detection and counter terrorism 
(which are components or subsets of the CIP process) as essential research areas (RNSA, 
2006).  
 
The Australian Government has also established a number of networks devoted 
entirely to CIP initiatives, most notably the Trusted Information Sharing Network (TISN), 
overseen by the Attorney General’s Department. The primary objective of TISN is to provide: 
“… a forum in which the owners and operators of critical 
infrastructure work together by sharing information on security 
issues which affect critical infrastructure” (TISN, 2006). 
 
TISN stresses the importance of a coordinated approach to CIP involving the Government, 
industry and members of the general public, providing a set of guidelines or principles that 
participants should adhere to. 
  
However, despite these Government and research initiatives, inadequate attention is 
paid the notion public data availability in Australia as a fundamental consideration in the CIP 
process. The relevance of this study is that it addresses public data availability from a threat 
perspective; that is, data availability is traditionally viewed as a positive aspect that can assist 
in CIP efforts, whereas the negative implications are often ignored. The focus of CIP efforts, 
to date, have been on the establishment of risk assessment and management strategies, thus 
reinforcing the need for the perceiving CIP from an alternative, but equally significant 
viewpoint.  
 
Public data availability, in terms of the CIP process, has not been addressed 
adequately in Australia. This research applies the US ‘sensitive but unclassified data’ study 
conducted by Breeding (2003) to an Australian setting. Breeding’s study found that there is 
the need for restricting access to public data, by striking a balance between data provision and 
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protection or restriction. The applicability of Breeding’s findings to the Australian 
environment will be assessed.  
 
The current research is unique and valuable in that it attempts to address the 
escalating public data availability situation, a present concern throughout Australia, which 
requires urgent attention. This is evidenced by a recent occurrence, whereby an individual 
was accused of terrorism-related preparations as a result of obtaining public data concerning 
the Australian electricity grid and a number of defence sites. These preparations involved: 
“…acquiring two maps of the grid under a false company name and 
downloading 38 aerial photographs of the defence sites” (Wallace, 
2006). 
 
The example indicates the significance of this research, and the importance of considering 
critical infrastructure protection, public data availability and community awareness in a 
collective manner. 
 
 Additionally, the significance of this research is evidenced by the increased attention 
received from a number of Australian agencies, such as the Department of Defence, the 
Department of Transport and Regional Services, and the Australian Institute of Criminology. 
Additionally, a number of research networks concerned with CIP studies have expressed 
interest in this investigation. The outcomes, and recommendations will be distributed to the 
appropriate agencies. 
 
The sources of justification, and relevance of this thesis are depicted in Figure 1.2. 
 
1.4 Aims and Objectives 
The aim of this report is to determine the potential threat of data or information being 
publicly available in Australia, and how aware security experts are of the issue of data 
accessibility to ensure CIP. A vital consideration is whether they are able to assist devising a 
solution to the censorship versus open access debate that can be implemented in a practical 
setting. The specific objectives of the study include: 
1. To identify the data supplying agencies across Australia; 
2. To collect public data from the identified agencies; 
3. To gather and record details on the security mechanisms encountered in the data 
collection process; 
4. To perform a content analysis on written security-related documents; 
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5. To display the possible methods of data manipulation; and 
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Figure 1.2 The Sources of Justification and Relevance of the Study 
 
 1.5 Methodology and Justification 
This comparative study will utilise a multi-method approach to data collection and 
analysis, incorporating largely qualitative research methods. Qualitative data generally refers 
to non-numerical records that are typically varied in structure and style (Richards, 2005). The 
qualitative methods utilised in this research are an observational study, a document analysis 
and a survey.  
 
The data collection and analysis methods to be used are depicted in Figure 1.3, 
including their associated relationship (a detailed description of the methods is provided in 
chapter 3). A notable aspect of the table is the perspective studied, which defines public data 
availability from the viewpoint of the identified individual. 
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Figure 1.3 The Data Collection and Analysis Relationship 
 
The identified research techniques are examined below. 
 
1.5.1 Observation/Internet-Based Collection 
An observation involves monitoring the state or behaviour of a particular entity, 
usually measured over a period of time (Richards, 2005). This study will observe or measure 
the nature of the public data availability situation over time, utilising an Internet-centred 
public data collection process.  
 
This phase requires an observation of the public data availability situation at a 
specific point in time, where data will be collected relating to critical infrastructure items, 
with a specific focus on Australia. The process of collecting public data using Internet-related 
sources is immense, and has been scoped for the purpose of this research, as indicated by the 
predefined collection process, discussed in chapter 3, section 3.4.1. The intention of this 
assessment is to determine the amount of information that can be collected about Australia’s 
CI. 
 
The steps to accomplish this task include: 
1. Identifying the data supplying agency sectors in Australia; 
2. Establishing a list of data supplying agencies, using Government directories and 
related searches; 
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3. Developing a profile of each agency; 
4. Collecting free public data from the agencies concerning critical infrastructure items; 
and 
5. Creating a repository of CI-related public data organised by data supplying agency 
sector. 
 
This methodology phase will be used as the basis of the remaining stages. 
 
1.5.2 Document Analysis 
A document analysis involves the use of archival records or written materials (both 
public or private) to gather data, providing that the collection of such records is carried out in 
an unobtrusive manner (Lofland et. al., 2006) 
 
In terms of this study, the document analysis will involve collecting a number of 
written security-related resources from the identified data supplying agencies. This process 
involves identifying the techniques, and documents use to govern and set out the manner in 
which public data can be used. The written documents may include privacy policies, terms 
and conditions statements, license agreements and disclaimers. The objective of this stage is 
to determine whether the existing security techniques are adequate in terms of limiting and 
preventing public data from potential misuse.  
 
The steps involved in this phase include: 
1. Collecting and recording details about security-related mechanisms and documents 
encountered during the data collection process; 
2. Analysing the documents, using the Leximancer software tool that will examine all 
documents in terms of the main themes; and 
3. Developing scenarios and demonstrating techniques that can be employed to 
manipulate the collected data, discussing whether the security techniques in place can 
prevent such activities. 
 
The data, and information gained from the first two stages will be used to construct the 
critical infrastructure protection survey of security experts. 
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Surveys provide a structured means of collecting data through verbal or written 
questioning, involving open-ended and/or fixed questions (Sarantakos, 2005). This research 
will make use of both open-ended and closed questioning techniques to measure the 
awareness level of security experts in Australia, on issues relating to public data availability 
and CIP. The survey responses will be expressed qualitatively. 
  
The purpose of this process is to determine the awareness level of security experts, 
who are defined members of the Research Network for a Secure Australia (RNSA), an 
association heavily involved in CIP-related research and collaboration. Therefore a security 
expert, in this instance, may refer to Government officials, members of tertiary institutions, 
infrastructure owners and operators, consultants, and other scholars.  
 
The steps in conducting this survey include: 
1. Using the findings of the observational study and document analysis to draft survey 
questions; 
2. Conducting a pilot survey to determine the validity of the questions, the types of 
responses to expect, and the necessary modifications to the survey; 
3. Distributing the survey to the intended community members at an annual national 
security conference held by the RSNA, and online to any RNSA member on the 
‘critical infrastructure’ mailing list; and 
4. Analysing the results qualitatively, and utilising the responses to devise a solution to 
issues such as data restriction versus open access. 
  
1.5.4 Methodology Elements 
The relationship between the methodology components, and the research objectives is 
illustrated in Figure 1.4. 
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Figure 1.4 Methodology Components 
 
1.6 Limitations 
The scope of this study has been restricted to 2 major factors: 
1. Geographic region; and 
2. Public data types. 
 
1.6.1 Geographic Region 
The focus of this research is on applying a study conducted by Breeding (2003) in the 
United States to an Australian context.  The research will concentrate collectively on CI in 
Australia, demonstrating the types of information, and the ease with which data can be 
collected. The data collection process is not exhaustive but is intended to be indicative of the 
CI data elements available for access, and reproduction in Australia. The primary objective 
for limiting the study by geographic region, and more specifically Australia, is due to the need 
to measure the public data availability situation in the country, an investigation that has not 
previously been attempted.  
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1.6.2 Public Data Types 
Public data has been confined to ‘sensitive but unclassified’ data, including the free 
and commercial variety. However, throughout the data collection phase, the study will further 
be limited to encompass only free data, obtainable from sources such as the Internet, public 
libraries, books and council resources. This is due to the nature of this thesis (and the thesis 
question), which is concerned chiefly with the free information available in the public arena, 
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This study examines the threat of freely available information on critical 
infrastructure protection (CIP) efforts, measuring the types of public data available, the public 
data supplying agencies, and the extent to which security experts are aware of the associated 
implications of public data availability. It is therefore essential to examine the literature 
surrounding public data availability and critical infrastructure protection, to correctly establish 
the context of the thesis question. The areas to be independently assessed include critical 
infrastructures (a definition of the term, and why critical infrastructures are important), 
critical infrastructure protection (the steps in the protection process, and the impact of recent 
events that have contributed to the research), and public data availability (the nature of public 
data, and the impact of information and communication technologies, and national security 
vs. open information access issues). 
 
A comprehensive understanding of these concepts will enable the gap in the research 
to be articulated, and allow for greater appreciation of the importance of the study. 
 
2.1.1 Conceptual Framework 
The conceptual framework in Figure 2.1 illustrates the various literature views 
(clusters) that contribute to the correct understanding of the thesis question. This research can 
be seen as combining the three fields of study, potentially resulting in contributions to all 
areas. 
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Figure 2.1 Conceptual Framework 
 
2.2 Critical Infrastructure 
Critical, by definition, refers to an entity that is essential or vital in nature (Bezerra et 
al., 2005). Critical infrastructures (CI), more specifically, are the essential services that 
contribute to the stability and security of a country (Chakrabarty and Mendonca, 2004; 
Rinaldi et al., 2001).  
 
From a historical perspective, critical services have been in existence since the 
development and growth of cities, which led to the need for water supplies (Mendonca et al., 
2004). In the Australian context, critical infrastructure encompasses banking and finance, 
transport and distribution, energy, utilities, health, the food supply and communications 
(Attorney General’s Department, 2006; TISN, 2006). More modern infrastructure types are 
the telecommunications services, including Internet and wireless technologies. For the 
purpose of this study, the term critical infrastructure represents the listed services. An 
important consideration is that a standard, global infrastructure definition and list is not 
available; rather, each respective country identifies the critical categories independently.  
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In terms of the Australian situation, the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
(ASIO) defines critical services as  
“Those physical facilities, supply chains, information technologies 
and communications networks which, if destroyed, degraded or 
rendered unavailable for an extended period, would significantly 
impact on the social or economic well-being of the nation, or affect 
Australia’s ability to conduct national defence and ensure national 
security” (ASIO, 2006). 
This definition is reflected in key Australian agencies that focus on critical 
infrastructures, and related protection campaigns such as the Attorney General’s 
Department and the Trusted Information Sharing Network.  
 
2.2.1 Physical and Cyber Infrastructure 
While critical infrastructure was traditionally described as the necessary physical 
services within a given community, the definition has been extended by a number of 
academics to encompass cyber infrastructures (Kun, 2002; Neumann, 2002; Overill, 2001). 
This is primarily due to the prominence of information and communication technologies 
(ICTs) in recent years, and the consequent increased reliance on computer networks.  
 
De Bruijne (2004), and Chakrabarti and Manimaran (2002) state that the progression 
of information and communication technologies has created a situation where physical critical 
infrastructures heavily depend on the support and operation of cyber infrastructures.  
Similarly, Overill (2001) states that physical and cyber infrastructures are interdependent 
entities; in particular the prosperity of physical services such as power, water, electrical and 
emergency services is reliant on digital systems or cyber infrastructure. These concepts are 
reinforced by Feglar and Levy (2004), who feel that computer communications underlie the 
global economy, and are required to ensure that physical infrastructures are properly 
functioning, as they are interrelated and interconnected.  
 
That is, the previously identified physical infrastructures require cyber services for 
survival and effective operations. This literature has raised awareness of the various aspects 
of critical services, and has resulted in the need for including both physical and cyber 
infrastructures in the scope of this study.  
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2.2.2 Infrastructure Interdependencies 
In addition to the relationship between physical and cyber infrastructures, it is vital to 
consider the interdependencies existing between the individual points of interest. These 
relationships are of particular importance to the thesis, as critical infrastructures today do not 
exist in isolation; rather there are physical or logical connections between them. Mendonca et 
al. (2004) describe critical infrastructures as “systems of systems”; that is, they must be 
regarded as interdependent services. While a number of studies (such as that by Rinaldi et al., 
2001) model or map such interdependencies, Mendonca et al.’s investigation assesses the 
impact of such interdependencies in a real world situation (that is, the impact of 
interdependencies on the events of 9/11). The research revealed that disruptions were 
dispersed across all eight infrastructures (as recognised by the US President’s Commission of 
Critical Infrastructure Protection). 
 
Schainker et al. (2006) agree with this claim; that critical infrastructures should be 
viewed as inextricably linked entities. This is evidenced in the authors’ study of the electricity 
infrastructure, which revealed that a threat affecting one area would undoubtedly impact on 
the dependent critical services. This is particularly relevant to aid in grasping the complex 
environment in which these services exist, and the difficulties in maintaining reliable 
operations, and protecting against potential vulnerabilities.  
 
To further complicate the situation, a study by Rinaldi et al. (2001) introduces another 
dimension to the issue of interdependencies, which must also be reviewed. That is, the authors 
examine a number of external factors, which also exert their influence. They include (but are 
not limited to) technical, health and safety, economic and legal/regulatory forces.  
  
As is evident by this body of literature, critical infrastructure relationships are 
complex, and difficult to define and manage. Therefore, a study on critical services must 
consider such interdependencies, as they ultimately impact on the critical infrastructure 
protection process. 
 
2.3 Critical Infrastructure Protection 
Critical infrastructure protection (CIP) refers to safeguarding the identified services 
from potential harm, including physical and/or electronic attacks (ASIO, 2006; Schainker et 
al, 2006). Amin (2005) and Mendonca et al. (2004) identify the sources of infrastructure 
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vulnerabilities as natural disasters, system complexities, equipment failures, human errors and 
deliberate sabotage/attacks. Similarly, Kun (2002) recognises these sources in view of 
national security, economic stability and public safety concerns, highlighting the importance 
of the infrastructure protection process.   
 
The value of the CIP process is also evidenced in a number of recently established 
initiatives supported by government and research bodies within Australia, but also 
internationally. For instance, the Australian Research Council (ARC) lists critical 
infrastructure protection as one of the major ‘Priority Areas for ARC Funding 2005-2006’ 
(ARC, 2006). Additionally, issues of threat detection and counter terrorism (which are subsets 
of the CIP process) are identified as essential by the Research Network for a Secure Australia 
(RNSA, 2006). This is also reflected in the policies of many nations, such as the US, which 
recognises critical infrastructure protection as one of its six mission areas (Yen, 2004).  
 
Thus, the protection of points of interest is a crucial issue for all countries, and chiefly 
aids in maintaining national security, an issue that has gained importance particularly as a 
result of a number of recent events.  
 
2.3.1 Recent Events 
CIP has been a global concern since the Cold War; however, the issue has gained 
increased exposure in Australia since the Y2K concerns of the late nineties, the incidents of 
September 11, 2001 and Bali, 2002 (Rothery, 2005; Luiijf and Klaver, 2004; Emergency 
Management Australia, 2003; De Bruijne, 2004). Such recent events, specifically 9/11, have 
raised public awareness of the vulnerabilities and risks existing in their surroundings, and the 
need for eliminating or mitigating these threats (Neumann, 2002).  
 
The CIP literature to date has a common element in that a majority of the studies cite 
these occurrences (that is, events of the past forty years) as creating a heightened need for 
protecting infrastructure networks (Amin, 2005; Amin 2002). Therefore, a situation presently 
exists where nations are developing the strategies and stages of the CIP process, in order to 
avert situations such as those identified.  
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2.3.2 The CIP Process  
As with the definition of critical infrastructure, the CIP process itself varies between 
nations. This process, whether referring to physical or cyber infrastructure, is constrained by a 
number of factors, such as social, political and economic aspects, in addition to a country’s 
specific environment (Bezerra et al., 2005).  
 
The first stage in the CIP process involves assessing the context in which the 
infrastructure exists (including consideration of the previously mentioned factors). A paper by 
Bezerra et al. (2005) suggests that a country’s unique context affects the CIP strategies 
implemented, using Brazil’s telecommunications infrastructure as an example. The authors 
propose a model for safeguarding this infrastructure, applicable not only to Brazil, but to any 
infrastructure type (in any country). The stage of determining the context is followed by 
measuring the threats to the identified critical services, the establishment of security controls, 
the creation of an ideal scenario and finally a comparison with the actual situation (providing 
necessary recommendations). 
 
Similar to Bezerra et al.’s research, a study by Luiijf and Klaver (2004) deals with the 
various phases in the CIP process, presenting the initial steps required in protecting The 
Netherlands’ critical infrastructures. The focus of the paper is on the ‘Quick-scan’ phase, 
which identifies the critical assets that require protection. An essential outcome of this Dutch 
study is the need for a multi-tiered approach to CIP (that is, providing protection at the 
strategic, tactical and operational levels). Other authors (Jones et al., 2003) identify risk 
assessment (identifying the risks, sources, interdependencies and developing threat scenarios) 
and risk management (cost evaluation, and conducting a trade-off analysis when selecting a 
response option) as core phases of the CIP process, which follow the identification of the 
critical infrastructure. 
 
In terms of the Australian situation, there is presently a Risk Management standard 
that may be used for safeguarding critical infrastructure, which was developed in 1999, and 
later revised in 2004 (Standards Australia, 2004).  The distinct phases of this process include: 
•  Communicate and consult; 
•  Establish the context; 
•  Identify risks; 
•  Analyse risks; 
•  Evaluate risks; 
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•  Treat risks; 
•  Monitor and Review; and 
•  Record the process. 
 
Whilst the mentioned CIP efforts are typically focussed on the protection of physical 
infrastructures, the importance of safeguarding cyber critical services is gaining recognition. 
Threats to cyber infrastructures can be just as damaging, and reach a greater population, 
because an attack may be perpetrated from across the globe, and on multiple sites (Elbert, 
2003). Feglar and Levy (2004) propose an independent process for protecting cyber critical 
infrastructures which includes scope definition, asset identification and valuation, threat and 
vulnerability assessment, risk analysis and risk management.  
 
Throughout the cyber protection process, Shainker et al. (2006) state that an 
important element in maintaining cyber security is to understand that the infrastructure (as a 
whole) is only as secure as its ‘weakest link’. This also holds true for physical infrastructures, 
due to the interdependencies discussed in section 2.2.2. Additionally, the elements of the 
cyber protection process can be aligned with the physical CIP phases, as a general pattern in 
the models emerges. 
 
For instance, Australia’s national guidelines for protecting both physical and cyber 
infrastructures involves risk assessments, public information and media management, 
prevention and preparedness, and response and recovery (Attorney General’s Department, 
2006).  
 
At this point, it is essential to reconcile the various definitions of CIP. According to 
Rothery (2005) of Emergency Management Australia 
“Critical infrastructure protection has become a general label for a 
range of activities undertaken jointly by government and the operators 
of key locations, facilities and systems to ensure they are adequately 
managing risk”. 
 
Therefore, based on the literature, it is possible to classify the range of activities in the CIP 
process into three broad categories. Although minor variations exist between the CIP phases 
internationally, the typical steps in the CIP process can be regarded as: 
•  Vulnerability assessment/scanning; 
•  Risk assessment; and  
•  Risk management (Luiijf and Klaver, 2004; Jones et al., 2003). 
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The rationale behind this categorisation is further illustrated in Figure 2.2, and the 
basic process for protecting physical and cyber infrastructure is presented.  
 
The studies in the literature concerning CIP are particularly pertinent to this thesis, as 
they all describe the phases that must be considered, with a particular focus on the 
preliminary stages of the CIP process (specifically in the case of Bezerra et al., 2005 and 
Luiijf and Klaver, 2004). In this literature, a clear gap exists in terms of the importance of 
public data availability as a fundamental force exerting pressure on the CIP process. Data 
availability, and open information access is generally perceived as a positive aspect of CIP 
from the viewpoint that it is essential in emergency management, and infrastructure protection 
activities. However, the potentially devastating effects of allowing open access to CI-related 
datasets have not been considered at the Australian setting. This is required in this era where 
e-Government is gaining popularity, and departments and agencies increasingly moving their 
data ‘online’, and providing a high level of transparency. This thesis aims to modify the CIP 
process through the inclusion of public data availability as a recognised, and major threat to 
the process, a move, which is supported by recent events that have relied on the availability of 









The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and the Level of 
Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australia 
 
                                       
 
-27- 











































































Figure 2.2 The Basic CIP Process for Physical and Cyber Infrastructure 
 
 
2.4 Public Data Availability 
Public data in this study is concerned with ‘sensitive but unclassified’ data that may 
be obtained through open or freely available outlets. This refers specifically to information 
that may be unclassified when used independently, but when combined enables inferences or 
previously unconsidered patterns to emerge, which may prove harmful to the CIP process 
(Thuraisingham, n.d.).  
 
Givens (n.d.) states that public records (or data) may be provided in two ways, either 
freely or commercially. Even though the latter requires a fee for access, it remains available in 
the public arena and can potentially be obtained by any individual, which makes it 
exceedingly relevant to this study. 
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In recent years, there has been a shift in focus from personal to geospatial data. For 
example, authors such as Givens (n.d.) focus on personal data, that is, information concerned 
with an individual, such as health and legal records. However, authors including Hariharan et 
al. (2005) concentrate on location specific data with regards to critical services. The authors 
describe the need to integrate geospatial data from disparate sources in order to improve the 
means in which data (particularly the commercially available variety) is accessed in 
infrastructure protection campaigns, such as emergency management and infrastructure 
protection. The intention is to provide seamless access to data required to improve protection 
procedures.  
 
Since the events of 9/11, a direct link has been drawn between data collection 
facilitated by information and communication technologies (ICTs) and the act of terrorism 
(Davies, 2002), or threats to CIP endeavours. The various aspects of ICTs in relation to 
critical infrastructure protection are examined. 
 
2.4.1 The Role of Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) 
The importance and increased use of the Internet, and Information and 
Communication Technologies (such as biometrics, database processing, geospatial 
information exploitation, video processing and visualisations) have amplified the risks on 
critical infrastructures (Popp et. al., 2004). These technologies provide outlets for 
data/information exchange, and have simplified the ability to transmit data. 
 
ICTs are providing tremendous opportunities for development. Kun (2002) describes 
the traditional technology focus, which has been on increasing the capabilities, productivity, 
and increasing the speed of technology whilst concentrating on digitising data, information 
and knowledge. The author feels that technology users have also become more proficient in 
utilising the available technology tools, and consequently accessing information. This 
proficiency in technology use also applies to terrorist groups, and individuals with a malicious 
intent.  
 
An introductory study into the consequences of public data availability on critical 
services (in the US) states that there is an increase in the education levels of the 
individuals/groups attempting to penetrate critical services (Breeding, 2003). Breeding’s 
method involves assessing various online sources to determine the threat posed by ‘sensitive 
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but unclassified’ data availability to US physical security. This thesis can be seen as an 
extension of this study, applied to an Australian setting (with an additional focus determining 
the awareness levels and opinions of security experts). Breeding’s study found that terrorists’ 
use of technologies, and the availability of certain tools, has become progressively 
sophisticated, allowing room for the collection, use and duplication of ‘sensitive but 
unclassified’ information, to be used for negative purposes. In a book titled Terror on the 
Internet: The New Arena, The New Challenges, Weinmann (2006) describes terrorist use of 
the Internet for information warfare (or cyber terrorism) purposes, and data collection.  
 
Information warfare is closely related to the issue of cyber terrorism, a term that was 
first used in the 1970s, but became popular in 1996. According to Overill (2001), the phrase is 
generally defined as the premeditated attack on information activities and infrastructures, 
whilst preventing an attack on one’s own information resources. That is, information warfare 
involves employing both an offensive and defensive strategy simultaneously. This issue is 
particularly relevant due to the over-reliance on computer or cyber infrastructures, most 
notably the Internet. While authors such as Elbert (2003) feel that cyber terrorism is a recent, 
genuine concern for the protection of critical services, Weinmann suggests otherwise. 
 
This author’s studies found that it is highly unlikely that terrorists will use ICTs to 
launch cyber attacks; however, the Internet remains a repository for the collection of 
information/data about transportation, infrastructures and maps, for example (Cherry, 2005).  
It is believed that terrorists are increasingly using ICTs to further their cause, and carry out 
their preparations (Davies, 2002). Furthermore, the “intelligence information gained by cyber 
terrorist activities can be used to support the more traditional forms of terrorism” (Elbert, 
2003). These claims support the underlying concept of the thesis, identifying the potential 
threat of public data availability. 
 
Relevant to this concept of data collection is the chief idea that information and 
communication technologies can both aid, and hinder national security efforts, with particular 
reference to terrorist threats (Kun, 2002). Authors such as Yen (2004), Popp et al. (2004), 
Stout (2004), and Amin (2005) provide some insight into these issues. 
 
Yen (2004) examines how ICTs can be utilised positively to advance the homeland or 
national security cause. Popp (2004) also shares the view that if used to their full potential, 
ICTs can ultimately  
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“Create a seamless environment where analysts and decision- and 
policy makers can come together to collaborate, translate, find, link, 
evaluate, share, analyse, and act on the right information faster than 
ever before to prevent terrorist attacks…” 
Whilst the authors state that ICTs can be used to enable improved, faster information 
sharing capabilities, between multiple agencies, allowing for enhanced analysis, 
decision-making and problem solving, they do not address the negative implications. 
That is, that these technologies are also at the heart of the national security problem, 
and may be utilised negatively. More balanced accounts are offered by Stout, and 
Amin.  
 
Stout (2004) describes the present age as a “hybrid era”, in that it promises great 
potential for technological advancement within an uncertain context (referring primarily to 
terrorist activities). Technology was previously viewed in terms of its ability to provide 
safeguards, however, the theme of Stout’s paper is that technology alone cannot prevent acts 
of terrorism, and data misuse. This is based on the premise that information and 
communication technologies are revolutionising the area of communications, thus enabling 
improved information sharing, specifically through the use of the Internet. This signifies that 
the efficient and correct use, and understanding of these technologies will determine the 
success of both malicious activities, and national security operations (Stout, 2004). 
 
Amin (2005) supports Stout’s claims, classing the protection of critical infrastructures 
largely as a technological problem or issue. The author feels that technology can serve two 
purposes; the first is to aid in penetrating or threatening a particular infrastructure, the second 
to provide protection mechanisms to safeguard the same services.  
 
The conflicting roles of ICTs have been widely discussed in the literature; resulting in 
the requirement to review a number of issues such as national security (including CIP) in 
terms of censorship, open information access, and the related privacy concerns.  
 
2.4.2 National Security, Open Information Access and Privacy 
It has been asserted that recent events (such as 9/11) could have been prevented if 
access to particular datasets in the public arena was limited  (Kumagai, 2003). This 
accordingly raises the need for controlling access to ‘sensitive but unclassified’ data, in order 
to maintain national security. These concerns introduce the concept of censorship, or 
restricting access to information that may be used in an adverse manner. Davies (2002) notes 
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that censorship, in another era, may have failed to be implemented or considered, as it attacks 
the basic principles underlying the right to privacy, free speech and open source information. 
However, it is now a current issue, which must be resolved or addressed, but is difficult to 
achieve, and somewhat impossible.  
 
Peace (2003) explores the issue of censorship in higher learning institutions, such as 
universities, measuring the importance of this area to heads of computer services departments. 
Survey findings (of 133 computer departments in the United States) suggest that the issue of 
censorship is not a priority at present, and will unlikely be one in the near future. Universities 
are in conflict in terms of restricting undesirable information, whilst allowing legitimate 
Internet sources to be accessed. This struggle exists perhaps due to the nature of ICTs, and 
particularly the Internet. 
 
In a study of the censorship concerns of the Singaporean government, Ang and 
Nadarajan (1996) state that the Internet “defies censorship” because of its inherent structure, 
and characteristics, most notability its capacity to allow public access to information, and the 
creation and distribution of data. The authors explore a number of solutions to this dilemma, 
including the use of technology to provide restrictions to information access on the Internet, 
in addition to stringent monitoring of Internet activity. However, they feel these solutions are 
inadequate, with the steadfast view that the Singapore government “cannot do much to censor 
the Internet”. These issues continue to be a topic of debate, with many views or solutions 
being offered by academics. 
 
For instance, Shearer (1998) provides an alternative view to censorship, highlighting 
the need for establishing a ‘Code of Ethics’ to govern communications over the Internet. This 
is based on a number of factors including widely available “public good” information, and 
methods of authentication/verification to access other forms of data. Shearer stresses the need 
for the “responsible global citizen” to overcome the negative aspects of Internet technology, 
requiring global community members to individually accept responsibility for their actions, 
and maintain basic human rights, environmental awareness, and global advancement. 
However, it must be noted that this paper was written in 1998, prior to a majority of the 
events discussed in section 2.3.1, after which the concept ‘public good’ has been generally 
disregarded in the literature. Instead, various governments, such as the Australian, have 
enacted technology-related (or censorship) legislation, such as the laws to intercept digital 
communications such as email.  
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While the discussion has focussed on censoring ICTs, a contradictory element exists 
in the literature, whereby there is the call for increased ‘intelligence’ or information access to 
assist with maintaining an appropriate level of national security. In recent years, government 
agencies have expressed the need for information or data collection in the interest of national 
security.  
 
Kumagai (2003) stresses the need for information access, with a focus on the FBI 
(Federal Bureau of Investigation), and its role in intelligence gathering and counter terrorism. 
The FBI is seeking to reform in a number of areas of intelligence gathering, such as increased 
data warehousing and data mining; that is, collecting data on individuals from various data 
sources and identifying patterns. In collecting such data, Kun (2002) raises concerns over data 
misuse, and its impact on civil liberties. This raises the issue of balancing privacy concerns 
with national security issues. 
 
Privacy literature and concerns have been in existence for centuries, however, such 
concerns have now been exacerbated, and personal privacy has been applied to the 
technology arena (Walters, 2001). A prominent academic in the privacy literature is Herman 
Tavani. In a paper written in 1999, Tavani discusses the privacy concerns introduced by 
Internet technologies, and how identifying such concerns is a complex process due to 
problems in defining the term ‘privacy’ (Tavani, 1999). Walters (2001) also concurs with this 
theory, offering many definitions of privacy, including the legal and social views, providing 
the underlying literature and differing views, but still struggling for a standard definition.  
 
Tavani (1999) and Walters (2001) also provide an alternative view, of technology 
being used to promote privacy; that is, through the use of privacy enhancing technologies 
(PETs). The situation is such that technology forms part of both the problem and solution. 
  
Givens (n.d.) discusses the delicate act of balancing access to public data and 
maintaining personal privacy, with particular reference to legal records (such as court files 
and case indexes). Governments are increasingly providing information online. Givens (n.d.) 
feels that the notion of e-government (and data provision) is primarily to allow the public to 
monitor the activities of the government. However, a number of negative consequences will 
inevitably arise due to public record access, most notably that the records will be used for 
secondary purposes (such as to make inferences, and to perform data mining activities). 
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As this body of literature has suggested, balancing national security, open information 
access, and privacy concerns is difficult. Therefore, when identifying the threat of public data 
availability, it is important to note that providing mechanisms to counteract such threats is a 
difficult task, beyond the scope of this research. Nonetheless, the study of this literature 
enables an accurate representation of the aspects affecting public data availability. 
 
2.5 New Contribution to Knowledge 
This literature review has provided an evaluation of the forces or factors that 
contribute to the thesis topic The threat of public data availability on critical infrastructure 
protection (CIP), and the level of awareness amongst security experts in Australia. By 
examining the three literature clusters (critical infrastructure, CIP and public data availability 
literature) it is possible to understand the complex environment in which the question is set.  
 
The literature portrays the situation to be one where complex relationships and 
dynamics exist, which consequently affects the critical infrastructure protection process. 
Additionally, it is clear that while there is adequate emphasis on the risk (or vulnerability) 
identification, risk assessment, and risk management phases of the CIP process, little attention 
is paid to the publicly available data that exists, and surrounds the process in terms of the 
potentially negative implications. 
 
The outcomes of this research aim to contribute to the critical infrastructure, CIP and 
public data availability literature by providing a representation on the views of security 
experts in Australia with regards to public data availability. As the literature review has 
illustrated, the balance between open information access and censorship has been studied, but 
little has been achieved in Australia in terms of restricting certain CI-related data that may be 
‘sensitive but unclassified’ in nature. Public data availability with respect to CIP is an area for 
concern, as is evidenced by a number of recent events, the effects of which could have been 
limited (or potentially prevented) had access to certain information been restricted from the 
public arena. Breeding (2003) has provided an introduction into this field of study, and this 
thesis aims to extend a number of the author’s findings (as described in section 2.4.1). More 
importantly, the validity of Breeding’s outcomes in an Australian setting will be assessed.  
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This chapter has presented the three literature streams that impact on the research 
question, including the related components. A collective review of the fields has encouraged 
the need to address the issue of how CI-related public data in Australia may be collected, 
reproduced and used, in addition to the consequent effects on the CIP process. At this stage, 
an important goal is to provide a methodology, and study that may be replicated or mirrored 
in other Australian communities and potentially in international settings that addresses the 
research aims and objectives. This will aid in enhancing or solidifying the CIP process by 
identifying the threat of public data availability, and suggesting a relevant solution or method 
that will allow the censorship versus access balance to be realised. This methodology is 
described in chapter 3. 
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The type of research questions asked determine the selection of a suitable research 
methodology (Veal, 2005; Jarvinen, n.d.). The literature review presented in chapter 2 
identified the gap in the research, and verified the significance of the research question. The 
review found that little attention is given negative implications of public data availability on 
the critical infrastructure protection (CIP) process, identifying a need for considering the 
potential threat in greater detail with a specific focus on the Australian situation. This chapter 
defines the research purpose (given the current state of knowledge and the research 
objectives), and identifies the research methodology to be applied to answer the thesis 
question.  
 
3.2 Research Purpose and Approach 
The research purpose is to determine the threat of public data availability on critical 
infrastructure protection, and the level of awareness amongst security experts in Australia by 
satisfying the associated objectives. The objectives of this study are: 
1. To identify the data supplying agencies across Australia; 
2. To collect public data from the identified agencies; 
3. To gather and record details on the security mechanisms encountered in the data 
collection process; 
4. To perform a content analysis on written security-related documents; 
5. To display the possible methods of data manipulation; and 
6. To assess the level of awareness, and opinions of security experts. 
 
The thesis question is unique in that it draws on three distinct fields of study as 
presented in section 2.1.1, amalgamating critical infrastructure, critical infrastructure 
protection, and public data availability literature. An assessment of the literature concerning 
this study has found that various research methods could be used but that the most pertinent is 
case study research describing a particular unit of analysis, such as a geographic region. This 
is evident in the topical research of Bezerra et al. (2005), Luiijf and Klaver (2004), Jones et al. 
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(2003), Ang and Nadarajan (1996), and most notably Breeding (2003). The current research 
applies Breeding’s US physical security study of the threat of ‘sensitive but unclassified’ data 
to an Australian context. The case study research method is appropriate to this thesis, having 
been shown as suitable in Breeding’s study. 
 
3.3 Research Strategy and Type of Investigation 
Yin (1994, p. 13) defines a case study as an empirical inquiry that: 
“Investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context, especially when…the boundaries between the phenomenon 
and context are not clearly evident.” 
 
This study is empirical in that it focuses on collecting and analysing data concerning the 
awareness levels of the security expert community, a phenomenon within its real-life context. 
This includes a clarification study of the threat of public data availability on the critical 
infrastructure protection process, describing both the threats and the associated awareness 
levels and opinions of the experts. Case study research often requires the use of “multiple 
sources of evidence” to answer the research question (Yin, 1994, p. 37), thus this study will 
use a variety of qualitative research methods to achieve one research strategy.  
 
3.3.1 Selecting an Appropriate Research Strategy 
Yin (1994, p. 4) believes that three conditions influence the selection of an 
appropriate research strategy. They include understanding: 
1. The type of research question posed; 
2. The extent of control over behavioural events; and 
3. The degree of focus on contemporary as opposed to historical 
events. 
In terms of Yin’s first criterion, the thesis question can be broken down into two components, 
and the following sub-questions can be asked: 
1. What is the threat of public data availability on critical infrastructure protection 
(CIP)? 
2. What is the level of awareness amongst security experts Australia? 
According to Veal (2005), the questions assist in identifying the data required, the data 
sources, the appropriate method of analysis, and whether the strategies are qualitative or 
quantitative (Figure 3.1). 
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Figure 3.1 Research Strategy Considerations, Adapted from Veal (2005) 
 
Qualitative data refers to non-numerical records that are typically varied in structure 
and style (Richards, 2005). The qualitative methods chosen for this study are an observational 
study/internet-based data collection, document analysis, and survey.  
 
Underlying this form of research is a general assumption about what is valid, often 
referred to as ‘philosophical perspective’, which defines whether the study is interpretive, 
critical or positivist (Myers, 1997). This research takes an interpretive stance, by describing 
data supplying agencies and security experts in terms of their complex environment and 
unpredictable behaviours.  A primary objective is to understand the situation (that is, the 
amounts of public data available and the level of awareness) with regards to the threat of 
public data availability on CIP. 
 
The appropriate strategies for this study are identified as survey and document 
analysis. The latter, however, is not (on its own) sufficient in establishing the threat of public 
data availability on CIP, as it represents only the perspective of data supplying agencies as 
opposed to a complete representation of the situation. The strategy is supplemented with an 
observational study, which according to Veal (2005, p. 110) can enhance a research project: 
“While it is rarely possible to base a research project wholly on 
observation, the technique has a vital role to play, either formally or 
informally, in most research strategies…it is capable of presenting a 
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perspective on a situation that may not be consciously apparent to the 
individuals involved.” 
 
This study is distinctive in that it observes the public data availability situation, as 
opposed to individuals, collecting public data about Australia’s CI from the most 
prominent data supplying bodies (see section 3.4). 
 
3.3.2 Research and Methodology Elements 
The chosen research design to address the research question can ultimately be 
described as: an empirical, interpretive multi-method, case study approach utilising 
qualitative research techniques. The relationship between the various methodology 
components is illustrated in Figure 3.2, as is the applicability of the chosen methods to the 
research question, and objectives. 
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Figure 3.2 Research Methodology Components 
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3.4 Observation of the Public Data Availability Situation 
An observation involves monitoring the state or behaviour of a particular site, usually 
measured over a period of time (Richards, 2005). This study will, however, observe or 
measure the nature of the public data availability situation in Australia over time, using an 
Internet-centred public data collection process. The scope of the observation has been limited 
for the purpose of this research, by considering only data supplying agencies, and data 
concerning Australia’s CI.  
 
3.4.1 Data Collection 
 This stage requires the identification of data supplying agencies in Australia, which is 
a substantial exercise given that a data supplier can be an individual, institution or body that 
directly or indirectly supplies data relating to critical infrastructure. Thus this task requires 
scope. The limits of the observation/Internet-based collection are: 
•  The Australian Government portal (Australia.gov.au) will be used as an initial 
point of identification for Government (Federal and State Departments) data 
suppliers; 
•  The profile of each department will be used to identify whether the department 
may possess CI-related data; 
•  The most prominent commercial data suppliers and other supplying bodies 
encountered while identifying Government departments will be further profiled; 
and 
•  The profile of each department is not exhaustive; that is, not all CI-related data 
elements will be reproduced and entered into the data repository. The profiles 
will contain the department’s name, the CI-related data element gathered, the 
appropriate website link, and the location of the data file on the accompanying CI 
(which will form an example of a CI data repository, organised by data supplier 
sector. 
 
The process of collecting CI data will further be scoped, due to the unstructured 
nature of the Internet. Gathering data on the critical infrastructure will be restricted to the 
accumulation of freely (as opposed to commercially) available resources, due to the time and 
financial limitations imposed on this study. Commercial data suppliers will be profiled in 
terms of the products they offer. To remove data collection bias, the process of collecting the 
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information will be structured, and standardised for all data supplying agencies, in terms of 
the: 
•  Initial point of collection (that is Australia.gov.au);  
•  Number of levels/pages on the website studied; 
•  Means of recording the CI data;  
•  The naming convention used on the CD; and 
•  Timeframe for data collection. 
This will result in a method that can be replicated (to produce aligned outcomes). The 
intention of this observation is to identify the data supplying agencies in Australia, and to 
determine the amount of information that can be collected (within the specified limitations 
and collection process) about the critical infrastructure. 
 
3.4.2 Data Analysis 
Data collected in the observation will form the basis of the data supplier profiles, 
which will examine the threat of public data availability on critical infrastructure protection 
through the creation of a data repository. The data collected will take multiple formats, and be 
stored in its original form on the accompanying CD. In terms of presentation, the data 
supplier profiles will be provided in tabular form in the body of chapter 4. This approach is 
considered the most appropriate and effective for displaying the outcomes of the data 
collection phase, and indicates the forms of data available, their related web address, in 
addition to the file name and location.  
 
This methodology stage will satisfy a number of research objectives: to identify the 
data supplying agencies across Australia, and to collect public data from the identified 
agencies. 
 
3.5 Document Analysis of Written Security-Related Documentation 
A document analysis involves the use of archival records or written materials (both 
public or private) to gather data, providing that the collection of such records is carried out in 
an unobtrusive manner (Lofland et al., 2006).  
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3.5.1 Data Collection 
In terms of this study, the document analysis will involve recording information about 
the security mechanisms encountered throughout the data collection phase for protecting 
public data from misuse, and governing the data access/collection process. It will include 
obtaining a number of written resources such as privacy policies, terms and conditions 
statement, licence agreements, and disclaimers. The purpose of examining these sources is to 
provide an insight into the public data supplying industry, and determine whether any 
safeguards are currently in place to protect public data from potential exploitation. 
 
3.5.2 Data Analysis 
Content analysis is the chosen method of data analysis, and involves categorising the 
information collected from the data suppliers in terms of the main themes that were 
addressed. This task will be achieved through the use of the Leximancer software tool, an 
application that: 
“Can be used to analyse the content of collections of textual documents 
and to visually display the extracted information. The information is 
displayed by means of a conceptual map that provides a birds eye view 
of the material, representing the main concepts contained within the 
text and how they are related” (Leximancer Manual, 2005, p. 4). 
 
In addition to extracting the key themes and concepts in the written security-related 
documentation, it is important to demonstrate whether the security measures in place prevent 
data manipulation from taking place. The data manipulation techniques will be discussed 
through the creation of scenarios. 
 
The data and information gained from this stage will fulfil three objectives of the 
study: to gather & record details on the security mechanisms encountered in the data 
collection process, to perform a content analysis on written security-related documents, and 
to display the possible methods of data manipulation 
 
3.6 Survey of Security Experts 
Surveys provide a structured means of collecting data through verbal or written 
inquiry, involving open-ended and/or fixed questions (Sarantakos, 2005). 
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3.6.1 Data Collection 
The purpose of using a survey in this study is to determine the level of awareness 
amongst security experts in Australia, regarding the threat of public data availability on CIP. 
A security expert refers to any member of the Research Network for a Secure Australia 
(RNSA), a network focused on CIP research. Consequently, a security expert may include 
Government officials, members of tertiary institutions, infrastructure owners and operators, 
consultants and other scholars. The survey will follow a descriptive design, that is, it will 
“produce information on groups and phenomena that already exist” (Fink, 1995). Survey 
questions will be fixed, and open-ended based on the outcomes of the previous two 
methodology stages.  
 
 The survey will be composed of the following sections: 
i. Introduction, informing the participant of the research aim; 
ii. Background, collecting information such as industry type and public data used; 
iii. Licence agreements, asking for responses relating to the effectiveness and ideal 
contents of the agreements; 
iv. Stakeholder matrix, asking the participant to determine which data elements should be 
available to various stakeholders; and 
v. Security measures, requesting that the participant stipulate the technical and non-
technical mechanisms that may assist in protecting public data from misuse. 
This survey is offered in Appendix A, and will be distributed at an annual national security 
conference and also online. Furthermore, a pilot survey will be conducted to determine the 
validity of these questions, the types of responses to expect, and the necessary modifications 
to the survey design. 
 
3.6.2 Data Analysis  
The data collected from the survey will qualitative in nature; a majority of the 
responses will be expressed in terms of the main themes highlighted, and how they can assist 
in better understanding and devising a solution to the censorship versus open access debate. 
The survey will be used as the basis of developing a stakeholder matrix that will provide a 
sensitivity-based grading system of public data based on stakeholders. Other important 
concepts, and trends found in the awareness levels and opinions of the security experts will be 
discussed primarily in textual form, but also with supporting diagrammatic representations.  
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The results will provide a representation of the awareness levels of security experts 
regarding the threats described by the previous methodology components, thereby satisfying 
the final objective of the study: to assess the level of awareness, and opinions of security 
experts. 
 
 3.7 Unit of Analysis and Time Horizon 
According to Yin (1994), the unit of analysis affects the research design and data 
collection method, and must therefore be carefully selected. Yin also states that the research 
question must lead to one favourable unit of analysis. The current thesis question does not 
point to a specific unit of analysis.  
 
In terms of the time horizon, this research is cross-sectional in nature. It involves the 
collection of data during a particular timeframe (that is, a snapshot of the awareness levels of 
security experts is taken). The various methods in the data collection phase, and the 
associated analysis of each method will be completed over a five-month period.  The expected 
outcomes include a content analysis, profiles, scenarios and qualitative results (of survey 
respondents’ viewpoints), which ultimately address the research question. 
 
 3.8 Conclusion 
This chapter has proposed an exploratory, multi-method, case study approach to 
addressing the thesis question, identifying the need for a document analysis, an observation 
and a survey for data collection purposes. The analysis of the data will result in qualitative 
data being produced, in order to satisfy the research objectives, and address the gap in the 
current literature. Additionally, the development of the research strategy has allowed for the 
structure of the remaining chapters to be determined. Chapter 4 will detail the observational 
study while identifying and profiling the data supplying agencies, chapter 5 will record the 
findings of the document analysis and chapter 6 will examine the survey and responses. 
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Public Data Suppliers in Australia 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to identify the public data suppliers in Australia. A 
public data supplier in this instance refers to any individual, institution or body that supports 
or facilitates the open distribution and use of information concerning Australia’s critical 
infrastructure. The data may be deliberately or indirectly provided. Of particular importance 
to this chapter are the identification of relevant data sources, and the classification of the 
types of information that exist in the public domain. This chapter is to be used in conjunction 
with the accompanying CD, as it is crucial to make reference to the collected files in order to 
appreciate the nature of public data availability in Australia. Relevant links are also provided 
to allow for additional research to be conducted. 
 
Data can be categorised in many ways. This chapter is focused specifically on free 
and commercial public data, which can be accessed physically and/or online, and includes 
multiple formats such as images, text, video, maps, geographic coordinates and statistics. The 
data presented in this chapter reveal certain aspects about Australia’s critical infrastructure (as 
identified in the previous chapters), and have been accessed through data suppliers in 
Government and commercial enterprises.  
 
The presentation of this chapter is unique in that the raw CI-related data gathered is 
represented in tabular form, demonstrating the outcomes of the data collection phase. The 
primarily motive behind this presentation approach is that it enables the data elements 
collected from each agency to be identified, the relevant links to be acknowledged, and the 
file to be viewed on the accompanying ‘CI Data Repository’ CD. The tables do not have 
headings, as they should be regarded as a primary outcome of this chapter. The data collected 
was reformatted into table form to assist in focussing on the content and specific data 
elements collected. Each table is composed of two distinct sections; the header provides the 
name of the data supplier, whilst the table rows each present a description of the data element 
accessed, a link to its original setting, and the location of the reproduced file on the CD.  
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To gain the maximum effect from this chapter, it is suggested that the description of 
data elements be initially read, and that the file be observed on the CD in its raw form. If 
further information is required, the web addresses allow for the original context of the data to 
be accessed. The tables collectively offer a textual representation of the ‘CI Data Repository’ 
CD, attempting to show the thought process engaged in throughout the collection of the 
public data, a process that can be replicated by any individual, most notably those who wish 
to engage in activities such as competitive analysis, fraud and on a grander scale, terrorism. 
Of great significance is the ease with which the ‘CD Data Repository’ CD could be developed 
using publicly available sources, and the ability to amalgamate data from disparate sources.   
 
4.2 Data Supplier Categories 
An assessment of the CI-related public data landscape in Australia enables the 
identification of a number of distinct data supplier categories. The classes primarily include 
the individual/physical data collection, Government bodies, commercial suppliers, utility 
companies and telecommunications providers (see Figure 4.1).  
 
An interesting observation is that a majority of the supplying bodies enable free 
access to information, in an attempt to increase knowledge and educate their intended 
audience. This can be referred to as an optimistic view of data provisioning; that is, the data is 
provided merely as a tool to assist individuals in better accomplishing certain tasks. The 
potentially undesirable consequences are therefore disregarded to an extent.  
 
The subsequent sections provide an introduction to each data supplier category, 
including the related sub-categories or agencies. Each identified agency has been examined, 
and significant public data has been collected to demonstrate the ease with which such data 
can be accessed. At the completion of this data collection phase, it is vital that the suppliers be 
considered collectively in order to gain a comprehensive view of the main components in the 
national public data environment. 
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Figure 4.1 Australian Data Supplier Categories 
 
4.3 The Individual/Physical 
This category represents first-hand data collection, where an individual independently 
collects critical infrastructure data from their surroundings. It is perhaps the simplest method 
of data gathering and access, as in most cases it does not require the assistance of a third party 
that may influence or prohibit the collection process. Certain data may require the use of 
entities such as libraries, Councils and information desks; however, others such as the 
capturing of video, photographs, GPS points and audio are independent activities. Publicly 
available critical infrastructure data that may physically be collected includes: 
•  Tourist guides/brochures; 
•  Hardcopy statistics, books and magazines; 
•  Maps; 
•  Photographs; 
•  Video and audio recordings; and  
•  Geographic coordinates using a Global Positioning System (GPS) tool. 
 
First-hand data collection may be considered one data simple method of data 
gathering, given that in most instances there are very little mechanisms in place to screen the 
individual gathering the data. Additionally, once the data has been collected, there are 
minimal (and almost non-existent) enforcement techniques that govern the manner in which 
the data may be used.  
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This source of public data collection was included in the scope of the study to ensure 
the completeness of the thesis. However, in terms of the public data availability debate, it is 
difficult to practically introduce stringent security mechanisms to prevent such data from 
being accessed. To do so would completely compromise the basic principles of a trusting and 
informative society and community. As a result, the focus is on electronic public data access, 
which is facilitated by the supplying agencies discussed in the remainder of this chapter. 
 
4.4 Government 
Government departments in Australia are prominent suppliers of public data due 
chiefly to their focus on providing an open and accessible data network through an electronic-
Government (or e-Government) portal. 
 
The e-Government movement of recent years has resulted in the trend to provide 
effortless access to information, in addition to the need to process information in an electronic 
environment (Wunnava and Madhusudan, 2000). e-Government “refers to the use of ICTs to 
promote more efficient and effective government services, allow greater public access to 
information and make government more accountable to citizens” (Punia and Saxena, 2004, p. 
500). Many Western countries such as Britain, Canada, the United States, and most notably 
Australia have been actively involved in e-Government initiatives since the mid-1990s (Lee 
et. al., 2005). 
 
Traditionally, the aim of e-Government was to allow the public to monitor the 
activities of its government. However, authors such as Givens (n.d.) feel that e-Government is 
now centred on public records access, resulting in a number of negative implications. That is, 
the available records may be used for secondary purposes, such as to make inferences and 
perform data mining activities, which can reveal undesired patterns about entities, which in 
this instance are Australia’s critical infrastructure.  However, positive implications do exist 
and signify a more informed and knowledgeable public, and a certain level of trust between 
Government and citizens, which is a desired and productive outcome. However, as Givens 
(n.d.) states, the negative consequences must also be addressed.  
 
The Australian Government is becoming progressively sophisticated in its provision 
of e-Government services, with government departments at all levels moving towards 
interactive services delivery (Davey, 2005). Additionally, the number of citizens making use 
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of the electronic portal is increasing, which is greatly attributed to the advanced and 
information-rich web pages. 
 
Given this concept of e-Government, it is crucial to examine the Australian 
Government portal (Australia.gov.au), and its link with other CI-related Australian 
Government departments. Australia.gov.au provides a gateway that connects the government 
with Australian citizens: 
“It links to information and services on over 700 Australian 
Government websites as well as selected state and territory 
resources. Australia.gov.au also searches over five million 
government web pages” (Australian Government, 2006). 
 
Australia.gov.au is used as an initial point of analysis; that is, it was used to locate 
independent government agency websites, and to profile each department with respect to the 
available information. The examination is provided at both the Federal and State Government 
levels to determine the types of public data concerning CI that can be accessed. The tools in 
place to administer such access were recorded throughout this data collection phase, and will 
be examined in the subsequent chapter. It is imperative to note that this assessment is not 
entirely exhaustive; but was merely conducted to measure whether public data availability in 
Australia is indeed an issue that must be reflected on in greater detail. 
 
4.4.1 An Assessment of Federal Government Departments 
The aim of this activity was to collect CI-related public data from Federal 
Government departments, using an Internet-enabled computer, and word processing and 
spreadsheet software as the primary tools for collection. A comprehensive list of Federal 
Government departments was accessed on Australia.gov.au, each department name linking to 
the dedicated website of the relevant agency, including the department’s function and role. 
The profile of each department was briefly examined, to identify whether CI-related public 
data may exist on the website, after which the site was briefly searched for publicly available 
CI-related information.  The Federal Government agencies considered in greater detail are 
identified in Figure 4.2. 
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Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF)
www.daff.gov.au
Communications, Information Technology 






Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT)
www.dfat.gov.au
Environment and Heritage (DEH)
www.deh.gov.au
Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS)
www.dotars.gov.au
Industry, Tourism and Resources (DITR)
www.industry.gov.au
Federal Government Data 
Suppliers
  
Figure 4.2 Federal Government Data Supplying Agencies 
 
Each department is profiled below in terms of the public data that was made 
available, using the defined tabular approach. 
 
Attorney-General’s Department (AG’s) 
A national security section mentioning the role of the department in coordinating 







File(s) on CD: 
N/A, navigate through the links above for further detail 
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Report containing how Australia will be protecting against the terrorist threat; that 
is, what Australia aims to achieve with respect to counter terrorism. The report was 
produced by the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, and can be viewed (and 






File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\Attorney General's\Protecting Australia.pdf 






File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\Attorney General’s\Counter terrorism plan.doc 
Link through to Emergency Management Australia, and more specifically the set of 
publications/manuals, which can be downloaded in pdf format or ordered free of 





File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\Attorney General’s\Evacuation planning.pdf 
Government\Federal\Attorney General’s\Incident Management.pdf 
 
Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry (DAFF) 








File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\DAFF\Food statistics.pdf 
Publications section, containing information relating to categories including the 




File(s) on CD: 
N/A, use the above links to browse the vast publications library 
 
Communications, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA) 






File(s) on CD: 
N/A, refer to websites 
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A large number of communications-related maps, including maps of mobile phone 





File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\DCITA\Mobile coverage.gif 
Government\Federal\DCITA\Sydney metro broadband.gif 
Government\Federal\DCITA\Video conferencing.gif 





File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\DCITA\Broadcasters.pdf   
Maps of all Australian States and Territories highlighting the remoteness structure 
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Defence annual report for 2005-2004 and Defence public environment report, both 





File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\Defence\Annual report.pdf 
Government\Federal\Defence\Environment report.pdf 
Navy video clips (and associated audio transcripts), which include such things as oil 




File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\Defence\Oil terminal protection.mpg 






File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\Defence\Fleet locations.jpg 
Government\Federal\Defence\Establishment locations.jpg 
Navy virtual fleet tour, containing behind the scenes information about the 






File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\Defence\Virtual fleet tour 1.jpg 
Government\Federal\Defence\Virtual fleet tour 1.jpg 
Army video clips, including such things as communicating in the field, infantry and 





File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\Defence\Army communication.mpg 
Australian Army website provides link to the defence library with many categories 





File(s) on CD: 
N/A, see link above 





File(s) on CD: 
N/A, videos can be downloaded from the provided above 
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File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\Defence\Air Force bases.jpg 
Link to DIGO (Defence Imagery and Geospatial Organisation). The site contains 
geospatial data and maps that can be accessed/purchased from agencies such as 




File(s) on CD: 
N/A, refer to links on website above 
 
Finance and Administration 
Main site links through to the Australian Government Information Management 
Office (AGIMO), which contains a guide for finding Government information. The 
primary sources of Government information include the Australian Government 
entry point, online directory and publications register. The publications register is 








File(s) on CD: 
N/A, refer to the links above 
The independent publications section of AGIMO provides guides and sources 





File(s) on CD: 
N/A, see link above 
 
Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) 





File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\DFAT\Trade data.pdf 
DFAT’s Market Information and Analysis Section provides current statistics and 
information. For instance, statistics concerning Australia’s trade activities with the 
Americas, Asia and Europe, in addition to others (see files below). The data can be 
purchased in its entirety; however, extracts are available free of charge. Statistics 




File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\DFAT\Americas trade statistics.pdf 
Government\Federal\DFAT\Exports statistics.pdf 
Government\Federal\DFAT\Trade topics statistics.pdf 
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Link to Austrade website, allowing access to a searchable Suppliers Database (see 





File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\DFAT\Supplier database.jpg 
Provides information and a link to the Australian Transport Safety Bureau, a body 
that investigates and reports on transport facilities such as air, marine, rail and 
road. Data available from the site includes (but is not limited to) Aviation data and 
statistics. A customised version of the statistics can be accessed by filling out the 




File(s) on CD: 
N/A, refer to link above 
Link to the Australasian Railway Association. The data available on this site includes 
an enlargeable map of the Australian rail network and document/report containing 







File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\DFAT\Rail network map.pdf 
Government\Federal\DFAT\Train radio systems.pdf 
 
Environment and Heritage (DEH) 





File(s) on CD: 
N/A, refer to link provided 
Link to the Australian Greenhouse Office and a map of operating power plants, as 





File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\DEH\Power plants.jpg 
 
Transport and Regional Services (DOTARS) 
Reference to the Bureau of Transport and Regional Economics. The Bureau permits 
access to statistics on various areas on transport, including general transport, 
aviation, land transport, maritime and regional. An example of the statistics 
available is the up-to-date Australian transport statistics report for 2006 with maps 





File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\DOTARS\Transport statistics.pdf 
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Maps on the Auslink road network and international airports and the railways and 






File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\DOTARS\Road & airports.jpg 
Government\Federal\DOTARS\Railways & sea ports.jpg 
Aviation statistics and airport traffic data, encompassing airline passenger statistics 








File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\DOTARS\Flights & passengers.xls 
Government\Federal\DOTARS\Domestic airlines.xls 
Land transport statistics section, which provides links to external agencies such as 




File(s) on CD: 
N/A, refer to the link above 





File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\DOTARS\Port statistics.jpg 






File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\DOTARS\Regional report.pdf 
Products section, containing information about databases and other products 
provided by the Department. An example database is the industry structure 
database, which is openly available (see associated file). Also available are online, 






File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\DOTARS\Industry structure database.xls 
Government\Federal\DOTARS\Online database.jpg  
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Industry, Tourism and Resources (DITR) 
Resources and Energy section comprising information about the electricity supply, 
energy, gas and Liquefied National Gas (LNG). This section also contains links to 
internal and external websites for related resources; an example is to the 





File(s) on CD: 
N/A, refer to link 
Link to Geoscience Australia, which contains a wealth of geospatial data and 






File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\DITR\Renewable energy.xls 
Government\Federal\DITR\Renewable energy.jpg 





File(s) on CD: 
Government\Federal\DITR\Gas pipelines.pdf 
 
4.4.2 An Assessment of State Government Departments 
The objective of this assessment is aligned with the previous, involving the profiling 
of Government-related suppliers; however, the focus has shifted to the collection of CI-related 
public data from State Government departments. New South Wales (NSW) is used as a 
representative example (case study), as it was not feasible to extend the scope to include all 
Australian states and territories for this thesis. The State Government Departments profiled in 
greater depth are presented in Figure 4.3.  
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Department of Education and Training
www.det.nsw.edu.au








Department of Primary Industries
www.dpi.nsw.gov.au
Department of State and Regional Development
www.business.nsw.gov.au
State Government Data 
Suppliers
 
Figure 4.3 State Government Data Supplying Agencies 
 
Department of Education and Training 
List of public schools by region. The link to each schools contains information such as 







File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Education & Training\Schools.txt 






Files(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Education & Training\School statistics.pdf 
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Link to NSW Premier’s Department (www.premiers.nsw.gov.au), which contains data such 
as a document containing information, images and maps concerning motorways in NSW and 







File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Education & Training\Motorways.pdf 
The NSW Premier’s Department also contains a document from the Freight Infrastructure 






File(s) on CD: 
Freight Infrastructure 
Premier’s publication area contains a complete copy of the Sydney Water Inquiry, which 





File(s) on CD: 
N/A, see the website above for a link to the report 
 
Department of Energy, Utilities and Sustainability 
List of local and metropolitan water utilities, and links to further information particularly 






File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Energy Utilities & Sustainability\Water utilities.txt 
The link to Sydney Water allows information about the company’s areas of operation to be 





File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Energy Utilities & Sustainability\Sydney Water areas.jpg 







File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Energy Utilities & Sustainability\EnergyAustralia network.jpg 
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List of and links to gas suppliers in NSW for additional information on the gas network, and 





File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Energy Utilities & Sustainability\Gas suppliers.txt 
List of and links to electricity suppliers in NSW to gain additional information on the 






File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Energy Utilities & Sustainability\Electricity suppliers.txt 
 
Department of Lands 
Lands Spatial Portal provides access to browser-based tools to access addressing mapping 
tools allowing an online query to be created and a specific addressed to be search. The 
search yields a scaled map, containing data such as address point, emergency facility, 
suburb boundary, LGA, road, property, strata, national park, state forest. The file provided 
below contains a search for a major street in Wollongong: Crown Street. The second link 





File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Lands\Address search.jpg 
Access to GSP (the geometry application), which uses three key layered datasets including 
cadastral, topographic and imagery and can be accessed via the link below. The file 




File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Lands\Geospatial portal.jpg 
Link to the Geographic Names Board of NSW, which contains two downloadable files of the 









Department of Local Government 
Excel file containing local Council contact details in NSW, including links to independent 





File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Local Government\NSW Councils.xls 
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Excel file containing local Council contact details in Sydney, including links to independent 





File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Local Government\Sydney Councils.xls 







File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Local Government\Regional Council map.jpg 







File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Local Government\Local Council boundaries.jpg 




File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Local Government\Comparative Councils.xls 
 
Department of Planning 
Identifies and provides information about the Transport and Population Data Centre, 
enabling reports and information to be collected relating to transport and employment in the 
NSW. A majority of the information is in electronic format; however, a number of resources 





File(s) on CD: 
N/A 
Transport and Population Data Centre report concerning the trips flows into Sydney and 





File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Planning\Trips.pdf 






File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Planning\Travel habits.pdf 
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Publications catalogue containing resources under the following categories: 1:100 000 maps 
and reports, 1:250 000 maps and reports, conferences, development assessment, 
environmental land use, housing, metropolitan planning- catchments and waterways, 
metropolitan planning- by region, regional planning- catchments and waterways, regional 
NSW planning- by region and population projects. Note that various publications require a 




File(s) on CD:  
N/A    
Links to other sources of transport data, such as to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, 







File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Planning\Transport data links.txt 
 
Department of Primary Industries 




File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Primary Industries\Mines.jpg 







File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Primary Industries\Minerals.pdf 








File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Primary Industries\Petroleum.pdf 
Map of the major coalfields in NSW, which are used as energy resources for the State’s 





File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\Primary Industries\Coalfields.jpg 
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Products and Services section containing a comprehensive set of Geoscience databases, 
maps, petroleum data (in addition to other resources), a majority of which can be 




File(s) on CD: 
N/A, use the above link to access information about the products and services 
 
Department of State and Regional Development 
Facts and statistics section on categories such as economic and business climate, trade and 
investment, labour and ethnic diversity, infrastructure and business and quality of life. Most 
of the resources in this section are in summarised statistical form. Also provides a link to 








File(s) on CD: 
N/A, summarised statistics can be accessed from the first link 
Regions of NSW profiles, containing information about the specific region’s infrastructure, 





File(s) on CD:  
Government\State\State & Regional Development\Regional profile example.txt 
Links (external) to the major transport facilities in NSW, such as CityRail, FreightCorp, Port 
Kembla Port Corporation, Newcastle Port Corporation, Roads and Traffic authority and 





File(s) on CD: 
N/A, see link above 




File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\State & Regional Development\Train network.png 
Government\State\State & Regional Development\Train network.pdf 






File(s) on CD: 
Government\State\State & Regional Development\Trade statistics.pdf 
Government\State\State & Regional Development\Trade overview.pdf 
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4.4.3 Government Evaluation 
The Government data collection process highlighted the ease with which data can be 
collected from Government-related websites. Core components of the Government’s role are 
to ensure the nation’s security and facilitate access to information. The assessment presented 
the issue of whether the national security process and in particular critical infrastructure 
protection can potentially be impeded by the availability of critical infrastructure data. More 
specifically, where the data collection process presented can be carried out more exhaustively 
by individuals intent on compromise Australia’s CI for various reasons such as vandalism, 
competitive intelligence, theft, fraud and terrorism. Chapter two introduced the concept of 
reaching a balance between open information access and data access restrictions/censorship in 
the interest of national security, and this is increasingly important given the outcomes of the 
data collection phase.  
 
Therefore this balance can only be achieved if a number of questions are asked, and more 
importantly answered with respect to Government agencies:  
- How much data should be provided to the public? Is it necessary that Government be 
completely open to the public in view of data provisioning? 
- Should data be provided to community members based on their profile or need for the 
data? Should data be openly available to all citizens? 
- Can data be categorised based on its sensitive, and the appropriate restrictions be 
applied? 
- Is public data availability and e-Government impeding the critical infrastructure 
protection process? 
- What are the future steps for Government with respect to this situation? 
 
4.5 Commercial 
Commercial data suppliers are bodies that provide products and/or services to their 
customers for a certain price, and under particular conditions. More importantly, they are 
involved in providing Government with data, which is ultimately purchased for internal 
Government and public use. The commercial bodies of interest to this study are those that 
provide information about critical infrastructure, or physical entities at a specific location. 
That is, they are involved in the provision of spatial data that can be represented on a map, 
with the associated geographic coordinates. 
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This section assesses four of the major commercial data suppliers in Australia (see 
Figure 4.4), listing the company’s profile, and performing an analysis of the products and/or 
services they offer. In cases where data is available without a fee, the security mechanisms 
encountered were also recorded for further analysis in the following chapter. It is important to 
note that the list of commercial data supplying agencies identified is not complete, but rather 
is used to illustrate the commercial public data situation, and provide an overview of the types 














Figure 4.4 Commercial Data Supplying Agencies 
 
4.5.1 MapData Sciences 
MapData Sciences offers “Business Mapping Solutions” primarily for the Australian 
and New Zealand markets, through multiple delivery mediums such as online and as a web 
service (MapData Science, 2006). The company is a digital mapping provider for sectors such 
as Government, transport and telecommunications. The major MapData Sciences products are 
identified and described below in table format. 
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Map Data Sciences Products 
QuickLocate® 3 Geocoder 




File(s) on CD: 
N/A 
RoadNet Digital Street Data 
Street database with associated layers containing information such as transport, 




File(s) on CD: 
Commercial\MapData Sciences\Melbourne.jpg 
G-NAF Address Table 
“G-NAF, the Geocoded National Address File, is Australia's authoritative address 
index of suburb, street, number, and geocode (latitude/longitude) information.” G-
NAF is a PSMA product, but is resold by MapData Sciences with additional attributes 




File(s) on CD: 
N/A 
Administrative Boundary Data 
Includes maps and data relating to suburbs and localities, postcodes, local 








4.5.2 PSMA (G-NAF) 
PSMA is involved in “facilitating the creation of and access to seamless national 
spatial datasets for government, industry and community use” (PSMA, 2006). PSMA 
possesses five key dataset, all of which are resold through the company’s reseller network, 
one of the most notable being G-NAF, which is The Geocoded National Address File. 
PSMA’s major datasets are profiled. 
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PSMA/G-NAF Products  
Administrative Boundaries 
Contains boundaries information in a number of themes, including Australian 
Bureau of Statistics (ABS) boundaries, Electoral boundaries, Local Government 
Areas, Suburbs/Localities and State boundaries. For more information, refer to the 





File(s) on CD: 
Commercial\PSMA\Admin boundaries.pdf 
Points of Interest 
A dataset comprising details about items such as cultural, defence, emergency, 
medical, post offices, sewage, transport and utilities points of interest. Refer to the 





File(s) on CD: 
Commercial\PSMA\Points of interest.pdf 
G-NAF® 
This data set comprises all physical addresses within Australia, each associated with 






File(s) on CD: 
Commercial\PSMA\GNAF/pdf 
CadLite® 
Information relating to Australia’s land parcels including suburb names and 






File(s) on CD: 
Commercial\PSMA\CadLite.pdf 
Transport & Topography™ 
The transport component of the dataset contains information about roads, rail, rail 
stations and airport network, and the topography component includes data about 
water bodies, major rivers, minor waters and oceans. A more detailed description 





File(s) on CD: 
Commercial\PSMA\Transport & topography.pdf 
 
The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and the Level of 
Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australia 
 




Sensis provides a suite of searchable products (both free and commercial) that allow 
for products, businesses, places, people and information to be located (Sensis, 2006a). The 








File(s) on CD: 
N/A 
Yellow™ 
Business listing site, offering 6 metropolitan directories and 50 regional directories. 
Provides the ability to search for businesses by address, map based or by browsing 





File(s) on CD: 
Commercial\Sensis\Yellow\Category search.jpg 
White Pages® 
Business and residential contact information, with over 8 million details stored in 
the database. There exists both an online and commercial services; the difference 
being that the commercials service offers high-speed access through a subscription 
based agreement. Enables the searching of categories by state, such as the search 





File(s) on CD: 
Commercial\Sensis\White Pages\Utilities.jpg 
Whereis® 
Provides location and navigation features, and offers a number of solutions 
including navigation, digital mapping, online services and business applications. A 





File(s) on CD: 
Commercial\Sensis\Whereis\CI search.jpg 
Commercial\Sensis\Whereis\Sydney hospitals.gif 
Commercial\Sensis\Whereis\Sydney police stations.gif 
Sensis® Business Information Services 
Offers customer data to businesses and the Government sector. The data can be 




File(s) on CD: 
N/A 
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MapInfo is an International commercial supplier that provides country and location-
specific data targeted at the business and Government community. MapInfo software, and 
data products are intended to allow users to visualise map-based entities, and allow for 
improved decision-making (MapInfo, 2006a). MapInfo is used by a number of global 
government agencies, and is focused on promoting e-government services that can integrate 
with MapInfo. It is designed primarily for use in national security and business continuity 
applications, most notably the location of critical infrastructure items. The software is 
applicable to all stages of the risk assessment process, from detection through to recovery 





Offers maps and data including street, demographics, postal, and administrative 
boundaries data. Australian related products in the data category include StreetPro® 

















File(s) on CD: 
N/A 
 
4.5.5 Commercial Evaluation 
It is significant at this point to reiterate the link between the Government and 
Commercial data sectors. Whilst data is available from the commercial bodies for a fee, 
Government agencies heavily rely on the Commercial sector for their data, and particularly 
mapping needs. Consequently, data and maps produced by Government are in some instances 
widely available for public access, use and distribution. This creates a situation where the link 
between the Government and Commercial data supplying agencies is becoming less defined 
(or blurred), and data is increasingly being made available to the extent that purchasing 
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location-specific and CI-related data seems unnecessary, as free data is made available on the 
websites of Government Departments.  
 
An additional crucial point is that any individual can access commercial data, 
provided that they have the necessary funds. With respect to an individual intent on causing 
harm, it is clear that no mechanisms screen the individual, and prohibit them from accessing 
the datasets. The motivation for suppliers in this category is evidently monetary; however the 
following question must be posed: does gaining profit from the distribution of CI-related 
datasets justify compromising the CIP process, and introducing national security concerns? 
Additionally, should there be stringent mechanisms in place to manage the individuals 
accessing CI-related data to ensure that any risks are minimised? 
 
Government and Commercially accessed data can further be supplemented with 
information collected from the owners and operators of critical infrastructure items. These 
bodies generally seek to educate the community about their products/services, but are 
‘unintentionally’ providing revealing information about their operations and infrastructure. 
For instance, some agencies are making available information relating to energy networks in 
an attempt to be transparent with their customers, but are in turn creating a risk in providing 
such information. To demonstrate the nature of this data provision, a number of the major 
utility companies and telecommunications providers are assessed. The names, and related web 
addresses of the organisations were located through Australian and State Government 
websites. 
 
4. 6 Utility Companies 
Utility companies refer to organisations involved in providing energy (electricity and 
gas) and water-related services to the community. The major utility companies throughout 
Australia are introduced in the Figure 4.5.  
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Utility Companies Data 
Suppliers
 
Figure 4.5 Utility Companies Data Supplying Agencies 
 
The websites of the utility companies have been examined, and a profile has been 
created for each data supplier. The profiles are similar to those produced for the Federal and 









File(s) on CD: 
Utility Companies\Sydney Water\Area of operations.jpg 




File(s) on CD: 
Utility Companies\Sydney Water\Sewage treatment plants.pdf 
The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and the Level of 
Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australia 
 
                                       
 
-72- 





File(s) on CD: 
N/A, see provided link 
Water catchments, filtration plants and pumping stations map, including a filtration 




File(s) on CD: 
Utility Companies\Sydney Water\Water.pdf 
Utility Companies\Sydney Water\Filtration overview.pdf 
Sydney Water supplier system illustration, each element can be clicked for 
additional information and annual reports and associated publications. A static 




File(s) on CD: 
Utility Companies\Sydney Water\Supply system.gif 
 
Hunter Water 




File(s) on CD: 
N/A, see link 






File(s) on CD: 
Utility Companies\Hunter Water\Dam fact sheet.pdf 





File(s) on CD: 
Utility Companies\Hunter Water\Treatment plant.pdf 





File(s) on CD: 
 Utility Companies\Hunter Water\Area of operation.jpg 
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File(s) on CD: 
Utility Companies\Integral Energy\Network area 1.gif 
Utility Companies\Integral Energy\Network area 2.gif 
Link to Energy related websites, such as Australian Energy Market Commission and 





File(s) on CD: 
N/A, refer to link for website details 
 
Energy Australia 





File(s) on CD: 
Utility companies\Energy Australia\Energy distribution network.jpg 
Map of proposed upgrades to the electricity network. An example of a street route 





File(s) on CD: 
Utility companies\Energy Australia\Proposed map.jpg 
 
AGL 






File(s) on CD: 
Utility Companies\AGL\Gas distribution network.pdf 
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File(s) on CD: 
Utility Companies\AGL\Electricity distribution.jpg 




File(s) on CD: 
Utility Companies\AGL\Generation assets.jpg 
More detailed information about generation assets, such as hydro electric map of 





File(s) on CD: 
Utility Companies\AGL\Hydro assets.gif 
 
 
4.7 Telecommunications Providers 
The major telecommunications providers in Australia (see Figure 4.6) have been 
profiled in terms of their role in public data availability. As with the utility companies, 
telecommunications companies provide public information solely for the role of educating the 









Figure 4.6 Telecommunications Providers Data Supplying Agencies 
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Description of the various facets of Telstra’s network and infrastructure, facts and 







File(s) on CD: 
N/A, refer to links 
Set of interactive coverage maps. A number of examples are provided, each map 






File(s) on CD: 
Telecommunications\Telstra\Coverage map 1.jpg 
Telecommunications\Telstra\Coverage map 2.jpg 
Telecommunications\Telstra\Coverage map 3.jpg 
Telecommunications\Telstra\NSW & ACT coverage map.jpg 
 
Optus 
Network coverage maps for various locations around Australia (see link). An 




File(s) on CD: 
Telecommunications\Optus\Adelaide 3G coverage.jpg 




File(s) on CD: 
Telecommunications\Optus\Broadband coverage.gif 






File(s) on CD: 
Telecommunications\Optus\Mobile coverage NSW.jpg 
 
4.8 The Public Data Availability Situation in Australia 
This supplier identification, and data collection phase was employed primarily to 
assess the disparate sources of public data in Australia. It is evident from the assessment that 
data can be provided deliberately or unintentionally, and can in both instances be reproduced. 
Data files, independently, may not appear particularly useful but as the profile tables and CD 
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show, when stored with data from various other sources result in a structured repository of 










Other Data (not examined in this study)
 
Figure 4.7 Structured CI Data Repository 
 
A repository of this nature allows for various characteristics of Australia’s CI, both 
individual and collective, to emerge. Such characteristics include previously unconsidered 
patterns, interdependency information and vital data that may be revealing and compromise 
the CIP process, thus affect national security. This structured process of collection can be 
replicated by any individual requiring little resources, and can be made more exhaustive and 
detailed with the appropriate funds and dedicated time. Therefore, an individual can engage in 
various preparations and activities with little inconvenience and detection, using publicly 
accessible information that was originally made available for the benefit of the public and to 
encourage openness in initiatives such as e-Government.  The data collected in this chapter is 
essentially in its raw form; that is no attempt has been made to manipulate to the data and 
establish patterns or inferences for the purpose of creating scenarios and understanding the 
characteristics and linkages between infrastructure items. It is merely an initial repository of 
Australia’s critical infrastructure-related data, collected from publicly available outlets. A 
comparison of the data available, the specific data elements, and the CI type(s) at risk is 
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provided in Table 4.1 to demonstrate the relevance of the public data collection exercise to 
Australia’s CI. 
 
Table 4.1 Comparison of Public Data and the Threat to CI 
Supplier Type/Title Major Data Elements 
(Attributes) Available 
 
What CI is at Risk? 
Federal/ Attorney General’s 
Department 
- Counter terrorism report & 
plan 
- Links to Emergency 
Management Australia & a set 
of publications/links 
- All infrastructure types 
Federal/ Agriculture, 
Fisheries & Forestry 
- Food production & trade 
statistics 
- Agriculture & the food 
supply 
Federal/Communication 
Information Technology & 
the Arts 
- Telephone services 
- Communications maps 
 
- Communications 
- Cyber infrastructure 
Federal/Defence - Defence establishments 




- e-Government information - Cyber infrastructure 
Federal/ Foreign Affairs & 
Trade 
- Trade statistics 
- Rail report 
- Rail network map 
- Supplier database 
- Transport 
- All infrastructure types 
Federal/Environment & 
Heritage 
- Culture objects & places 
information 
- Power plant maps 
- Renewable energy 




- 2006 transport statistics 
report 
- Transport map 
- Road, airport & rail network 
maps 
- Airline statistics 
- Shipping & ports statistics 
- Regional data 
- Transport 
Federal/ Industry, Tourism 
& Resources 
- Energy supply details 
- Spreadsheet of renewable 
energy operators 
- Gas pipelines 
- Energy 
State/Department of 
Education & Training 
- Searchable public school 
database 
- Statistical education 
information 
- Motorways in NSW (existing 
& proposed) 





Energy, Utilities & 
Sustainability 
- Local & metropolitan water 
utilities list 
- Sydney Water operations 
map 
- Energy Australia electricity 
network map 
- Gas network information 
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State/Department of Lands - Mapping tool for locating 
things such as roads, 
properties & national parks 
- Geographic names register 
CSV file 
- All infrastructure types 
(particularly transport) 
State/Department of Local 
Government 
- Excel file of Council contact 
details 
- Detailed Council information 
by region 




- Transport & population 
statistics, maps & graphs 




- Map of mines 
- Petroleum, coal mines & 
energy maps & resources 
- Energy 
State/Department of State 
& Regional Development 
- Economic, trade, 
infrastructure & business 
statistics & facts 
- Regional profile, with 
transport and major networks 
information 
- NSW train network 
- Ports data 




- Address locator 
- Street database, containing 
transport, towns & points of 
interest data 
- All infrastructure types 
Commercial/PSMA, G-NAF - Points of interest, such as 
cultural, defence, emergency, 
medical, post offices, sewage, 
transport and utilities 
- Physical addresses datasets 
- Transport dataset 
- All infrastructure types 
Commercial/Sensis - Telephone service 
- Business & residential 
information 
- Points of interest maps 
- All infrastructure types  
 
 
Commercial/MapInfo - Streets, demographics, postal 
& administrative boundaries 
data 
- All infrastructure types 
Utility Companies/Sydney 
Water 
- Area of operations map 
- Sewage treatment plants 
map 





- Supply & performance 
statistics 
- Dam fact sheets 
- Treatment plant diagrams 










- Network map 
- Proposed upgrades to 
electricity network map 
- Energy 
- Electricity 
Utility Companies/AGL - Gas distribution network - Gas 
Telecommunications 
Providers/Telstra 
- Network information 
- Interactive coverage maps 
- Communications 
- Cyber infrastructure 
Telecommunications 
Providers/Optus 
- Network coverage maps 
- Broadband network map 
- Mobile coverage in NSW 
- Communications  
The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and the Level of 
Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australia 
 




In addition to the comparison in the table, the use of a geographic information system 
(GIS) can allow for the data elements to be further combined through the use of longitude and 
latitude coordinates, associating the data to a particular location. This allows for a graphical, 
map-based representation of CI-related data to be created, also allowing for detailed analysis 
of the data. 
 
4.9 Conclusion 
The outcome of this chapter has been the identification of data supplying categories 
and agencies in Australia, and the creation of a data repository containing information relating 
to the country’s CI. The examination highlighted the ease with which data could be collected, 
and the potential for more detailed data and analysis through commercial agencies. A 
majority of the data has been provided for positive purposes; however, it appears that this 
level of transparency could provide a threat or negative implications for the critical 
infrastructure protection process (identified in previous chapters). Throughout this phase of 
data collection, the security mechanisms encountered at each of the websites have been 
recorded, to allow for further analysis of public data availability to be conducted. Chapter 5 
will assess these security mechanisms through the use of a content analysis of the security-
related documents, which were the primary methods used to govern access to the public data 
collected. A discussion of the technical and non-technical public data-related security 
techniques will be presented. In addition, the data collected in this Chapter will assist in 
creating scenarios in the following chapter using a number of counter-terrorism techniques, 
and the implications of this analysis will be deliberated on. 
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The objective of this chapter is to discuss the security-related mechanisms 
encountered during the data collection process described in chapter 4. Various security 
techniques were identified, such as password-protected access, licencing schemes and written 
documentation, the latter being the most prominent form. Consequently, a content analysis of 
twenty-five written security-related documents was conducted to identify the main themes 
and fundamental concepts collectively raised by the data supplying entities. The major 
concepts and clusters will be discussed in greater detail and the effectiveness of the written 
documentation in minimising the threat of public data availability will be examined. Despite 
the intentions of such security techniques, it is clear that the capacity to manipulate public 
data is present; it is possible to engage in the creation of threat scenarios using tools such as 
electronic data management and processing, and geospatial information exploitation. A 
number of scenarios are provided for demonstrative purposes, all of which are concerned with 
describing the threat of public data availability on CIP by indicating the manner in which 
Australia’s CI can be compromised utilising the data from the previous chapter. It is evident 
that existing security techniques must be reviewed in greater detail to appreciate the realistic 
nature of public data access. A structured means of evaluating and improving the mechanisms 
is offered through the Public Data Protection Lifecycle. 
 
5.2 Public Data Security Techniques 
Throughout the process of collecting public data concerning Australia’s critical 
infrastructure (chapter 4), a number of security techniques were discovered. They primarily 
comprise 
i. password-protected access, 
ii. registration/licencing; and 
iii. written documentation. 
 
When considering the security techniques, it is crucial to indicate that the methods 
employed do not deter an individual from openly accessing the available data with ease. The 
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most ‘stringent’ techniques that were encountered included accepting terms and conditions, 
password-protected access and a multi-staged registration/licencing process as demonstrated 
by the Department of Lands, Department of Communication Information Technology and the 
Arts and Geoscience Australia respectively.  
 
The Department of Lands provides access to the Lands Spatial Portal, which requires 
the user to consent to the department’s terms and conditions (see Figure 5.1). The process of 
accessing the data is simple, requiring the user to select the ‘Accept’ option with no further 
agreements, licences or policies to be read.  
 
Source: Department of Lands (2006)
 
Figure 5.1 Department of Lands Security Mechanisms 
 
The Department of Communication, Information Technology and the Arts (DCITA) 
makes use of a disclaimer, and password protection mechanisms for maps such as fixed 
infrastructure, internet access facilities, and internet points of presence (refer to Figure 5.2). 
This process is more effective than that of the Department of Lands; however, it is worth 
noting that not all DCITA maps are password-protected. That is, only select maps are 
restricted for internal use, while others can be openly gathered. 
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Password Protected Access 
 
Figure 5.2 DCITA Security Mechanisms 
 
Geoscience Australia utilises an alternative process of registration/licencing, which is 
the most comprehensive method encountered during the data collection phase. This process 
involves multiple steps as highlighted in Figure 5.3. The user is required to register to obtain 
information and datasets by: 
i. Reading the spatial data access policy and licence files; 
ii. Entering personal details; 
iii. Reading and agreeing to the licence agreement; 
iv. Specifying how they intend to use the data; 
v. Receiving a registration confirmation email; and 
vi. Obtaining a download notification email, containing a link to the desired file. 
The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and the Level of 
Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australia 
 
                                       
 
-83- 
Each time an individual wishes to access particular datasets from Geoscience Australia, they 
must complete steps c to f, after which the data may be collected, duplicated and utilised for 
the individual’s specific purposes. 
 
Geoscience Australia Registration/Licencing Stages
Source: Geoscience Australia (2006) & OSDM (2006)
 
Figure 5.3 Geoscience Australia Security Mechanisms 
 
An overall assessment of the security mechanisms clearly illustrates that there is a 
greater concentration on the use of written documentation to govern public data, Internet, and 
Government portal access. Written security-related documentation can include materials such 
as privacy policies, terms and conditions of use statements, copyright agreements, disclaimers 
and licence statements. All of these documents set out details and conditions for using a 
particular resource. The most applicable document with respect to CI-related public data is 
the licence agreement, which is discussed in greater detail in chapter 6.  
The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and the Level of 
Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australia 
 




Public data security documentation is intended to control the use of the data available 
on websites; therefore it is crucial to understand that this analysis does not refer exclusively to 
the use and/or licencing of data. That is, there exists a situation where the written documents 
can apply to three different contexts: 
1. Internet: to protect and govern website use; 
2. Government: to maintain the interests of the Government as a data supplying body; 
and 
3. Data: to outline the nature of public data use. 
Regardless of these factors, public data is provided via the Internet through Government 
portals, which implies the need for the security-related mechanisms to cover and apply to all 
three sectors.  
 
In many instances, the documentation applies to the first two sectors; the manner in 
which public data can be used is simply alluded to, analogous to fine print in legal documents 
or endnotes in a thesis. With the exclusion of a number of agencies (that is, the Department of 
Lands, DCITA, and Geoscience Australia), data supplying bodies do not attempt to directly 
promote their security enforcement mechanisms. More importantly, there is concern over the 
content of the materials, in terms of whether they legally provide, and to some extent enforce, 
adequate protection for the three areas, thus introducing the need for a content analysis to be 
performed on the collected security-related documentation.  
 
5.3 Content Analysis of Security-Related Documentation 
The content analysis revealed that the prominent concepts within the security-related 
documentation include ‘Information’, ‘Data’, ‘Copyright’, ‘Liability’, ‘Licence’, ‘Accuracy’, 
‘Access’, ‘Notice’ and ‘Damage’. There is the need to perform an examination of each term 
(refer to Table 5.1 for relevant definitions) with respect to public data availability, and an 
analysis of the relationship between key clusters, and terms. This assessment will aid in 
establishing the validity of the written documentation as an appropriate method of data 
protection, and allow for further discussion and improvement of the documents to be 
attempted and suggested. 
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Table 5.1 Key Concept Definitions 
Concept Definition 
Information General website content, such as a description of the data 
supplying agency and details about its operations or 
functions 
Data Downloadable files, statistics, images and documents that 
can be accessed, stored and potentially modified by an 
individual 
Copyright Protection against unlawful use and duplication of data 
and/or information 
Liability Who is responsible or accountable for the negative 
consequences arising from using information and/or data 
Licence Sets out the conditions, permissions and nature of data use 
Accuracy Quality and completeness of information 
Access Right to gather or obtain public information and/or data 
Notice Informing the data supplying agency that information 
and/or data will be used for a purpose other than that 
specified in the documentation, and seeking permission to 
engage in such use 
Damage Problem or negative consequence arising from information 
use 
 
A high level inspection (see Figure 5.4) of the important themes shows clear 
clustering between ‘Information’, ‘Liability’, ‘Damage’ and ‘Accuracy’, meaning that the 
concepts are related as they co-occur in similar contexts. An interesting note is that concepts 
such as ‘Data’ and ‘Licence’ are clearly isolated from other themes, thus indicating that the 
linkage between the two concept groups is relatively weak. A weak relationship is an 
undesired outcome given that an ideal security-related document should contain close or tight 
linkages between such clusters. That is, ‘liability’, ‘damage’ and ‘accuracy’ should be applied 
or related to the licencing of public data and vice versa. The two distinct groups are discussed 
with reference to why they are dominant within the documentation, and establishing the 
context in which they are used. Similarly, the issue of copyright is reflected on due to its 
prominence in the documentation. A key question is how effective this technique is in 
preventing public data from exploitation. 
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Figure 5.4 Content Analysis of Security-Related Documentation 
 
5.3.1 The Information-Liability-Damage-Accuracy Cluster 
This cluster demonstrates a clear trend in the written documentation, focused on 
accountability. The central theme is that the data supplying agencies wish to renounce 
responsibility for the negative consequences that may arise from the use of information 
contained on their website. Many agencies provide information simply "for the purpose of 
disseminating information free of charge for the benefit of the public" (Department of 
Environment and Heritage, 2006), but claim no responsibility for damage resulting from its 
use. The damage in this instance refers primarily to the accuracy of the information, more so 
than its transparency or what it may reveal about Australia's critical infrastructure: 
“Energy Australia will not be liable for any indirect or consequential 
loss arising out of the use of the website, including loss of profits” 
(Energy Australia, 2006). 
These sentiments are shared by agencies such as The Australian Gas Light Company 
(2006) and Integral Energy (2006), amongst others, in their legal notices and disclaimer 
statements.  
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While this cluster does not refer specifically to public data use, it is vital to 
understand that public data is often confused with information; the line between the two 
concepts is exceedingly blurred. A majority of agencies are not conscious that they are 
indirect public data providers, and should perhaps revise their content and apply security 
measures accordingly. Thus, they simply provide disclaimers and other policies to protect 
themselves, but have not clearly considered their responsibility to ensuring that Australia's CI 
is not compromised using their publicly available information, which in this case is primarily 
details relating to the operations and networks of each respective body. 
 
5.3.2 The Data-Licence Cluster 
The Data-Licence cluster refers to the conditions defined by data supplying bodies to 
control the manner in which an individual may use data. Throughout the data collection 
process, licences of varying degree of detail were identified. The Office of Spatial Data 
Management (on behalf of Geoscience Australia) provided one of the most comprehensive 
licences, specifying the nature of the licence, access to data and end user notice details. For 
example: 
 “Access to Data: The Licensee must access the Data, including any 
current updates to the Data, using a validated email address, or any 
other authentication procedure as notified by OSDM from time to 
time.   
End-user notices: The Licensee must include a notice in the metadata 
supplied to End-users with the Data or Derivative Product, to make 
End-users aware that the Data was sourced from the Commonwealth 
and is used under licence and to disclose the nature of any 
modification the Licensee has made to the Data" (Office of Spatial 
Data Management, 2006).  
 
The OSDM licence agreement also contains details such as: 
- Retention of notices; 
- Records of distribution; 
- Responsibility for employees and agents; 
- Term; and 
- Termination. 
 
An interesting detail of the licence is that an individual may "use, reproduce, modify, 
commercially exploit and communicate the data..." (Office of Spatial Data Management, 
2006) in any way once the licence has been granted. This differs from other data supplying 
bodies, such as the Sensis that requires written permission for data to be reformatted and 
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displayed, and the data cannot be used for commercial purposes (Sensis, 2006b). Similarly, 
the Department of Lands (2006) requires permission to be granted before any manipulation of 
data is carried out. 
  
As was mentioned, the Data-Licence cluster is clearly isolated from the previously 
introduced cluster, and licences concerning public data access seem incomplete to an extent. 
That is, once the data is accessed there are no obvious procedures in position to restrict users 
carrying out unauthorised modifications to the data. This lack of enforcement presents a clear 




Copyright was a central theme in the content analysis, with copyright statements 
aiming to protect against the illegal use and duplication of data and/or information. Although 
a clear linkage was not evident in the content analysis, an ideal situation would see the 
copyright statement interweaved with the previous two clusters, relating to information and 
data. The information in such statements are intended to define the manner in which 
information and/or data can be used, and reveal the consequences of any illegitimate 
activities. Most agencies, including the Attorney General's Department (2005), Department of 
Defence (2005), NSW Department of Education and Training (2001) and Department of 
Transport and Regional Services (2006), succeed in providing these details: 
“You may download, display, print and reproduce this material in 
unaltered form only (retaining this notice and imagery metadata) for 
your personal, non-commercial use or use within your family or 
organisation” (Department of Defence, 2005). 
As with the previous cluster, the copyright statements appear relatively weak due to the lack 
of policing and enforcement. Consequently, disregarding the copyright statements is not 
difficult. 
 
5.4 Applying the Content Analysis in a Realistic Setting 
It is clear that there are flaws or inconsistencies in the techniques presently used to 
govern public data (information) use. An individual is able to obtain public data with relative 
ease, and little inconvenience. The most structured and stringent method encountered in this 
study (that of Geoscience Australia) possesses many positive features, but there are clearly 
missing elements. Despite the intention of the registration process and documentation, little or 
close to no contact is made with the individual accessing the data, with no ‘policing’ strategy 
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in place to ensure security once the data has been accessed. Public data availability in 
Australia is undoubtedly a risk to the CIP process; therefore, the threat of public data 
availability can, and should be treated as a risk that must be minimised. This risk requires a 
structured strategy or lifecycle to ensure that it is reduced before the public data availability 
situation in Australia escalates. A lifecycle is suggested, based on risk mitigation literature, 
and the previously presented CIP process.  
 
5.5 The Public Data Protection Lifecycle 
This study proposes that the threat of public data availability be categorised in a 
similar manner to any risk and be managed by adapting existing risk management procedures, 
such as that developed by Standards Australia (2004). Additionally, there is the need to align 
the CIP risk assessment process presented in chapter 2 (section 2.3.2) to that of protecting 
public data using written documentation. Ideally, the process should be applied to Internet-
related information, and be adopted by all public data suppliers across Australia for it to be 
effective, specifically within the Federal and State Government areas, requiring public data 
availability to be centrally managed.  
 
A Public Data Protection Lifecycle has been proposed using the outcomes of the data 
collection phase and the content analysis. The lifecycle should answer the following 
questions: 
1. What public data requires protection? Which of the identified data elements are 
considered sensitive? How accurate is the data?  
2. What are the potential risks? What are the sources of the risk? What threat scenarios 
are possible?  
3. Who will be granted access to the data? What a user can and cannot do with the data? 
Must the user provide notice of any data manipulation that takes place or ask for 
permission? What issues are applicable, for example, licencing and copyright issues? 
Do any significant dependencies exist between data elements?  
4. What is the response if the scenario or breach were to eventuate? 
5. Who is responsible for the negative implications that may arise? How will users be 
notified of their responsibility; is accountability information going to be stipulated in 
the written documentation? How liable are the data supplying agencies?  
6. Will the success of the lifecycle be measured? How will the lifecycle be examined in 
terms of effectiveness? How often will the lifecycle be reviewed?  
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7. Will the process be recorded for future purposes? How will data suppliers be notified 
of the changes to the process? What techniques will be used to notify individuals of 
changes to the new process?  
 
By articulating these questions, a number of distinct phases for protecting public data 
using written documentation can be drawn out. The ensuing process is presented graphically 
(Figure 5.5) in a cyclical fashion with each node representing a set of questions from the 
proposed Public Data Protection Lifecycle. The phases collectively establish a finer 
understanding of what is expected from public data users, through to the consequences of any 
breach or misuse of data, forming a lifecycle or iterative loop that can diminish public data 
threat to CIP, and encourage that the process assume a more structured form. In particular, it 
introduces the concept of policing or follow-up procedures to ensure that the process is 
credible and achieve the ultimately desired outcome of protecting public data concerning 
Australia’s CI. 
 
Although the lifecycle is targeted in this section at written documentation such as 
licence agreements, privacy policies, disclaimers and copyright statements, it provides 
flexibility to allow for additional security mechanisms to safeguard public data (and 
consequently the CIP process) to be incorporated at a later date. This ultimately results in an 
adaptable and layered approach to manage public data availability in Australia, whilst also 
solidifying the existing method written documentation, which is currently the most stringent 
technique employed. It is valuable at this stage to evaluate the present use of the lifecycle 
stages. 
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Establish context of 
public data & relative 
sensitivity
Identify the risks to 
the CIP process of 
the data being 
available
Evaluate/measure 
the risk & define 
access, licencing & 
security mechanisms 
(based on outcomes 
of stages 1 & 2)
Determine liability in 
the particular 
situation
Specify the response 
& consequences if 
risk eventuates




and review the 
process








Figure 5.5 Proposed Public Data Protection Lifecycle 
  
5.6 The Current State of the Public Data Protection Lifecycle in 
Australia 
To reiterate, the underlying account emerging from the content analysis is, that 
current written documentation only partially covers the ideal lifecycle phases. Presently, the 
Australian data suppliers studied in this research all display weaknesses in the proposed 
Public Data Protection Lifecycle. It appears in many instances that the initial decision in 
determining what data is made publicly available and what data is too sensitive to be made 
available is absent. That is, in the majority of cases there has been no attempt to classify CI-
related data based on sensitivity, and the decision to release certain data to the public has 
never been authorised. 
 
Additionally, the latter stages of the cycle are overlooked; there are no enforcement 
mechanisms in place to prevent public data from being used in a prohibited manner. Whilst in 
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many instances, there is reference to the fact that data cannot be manipulated, or taken out of 
its original context and format, there exists the opportunity to do so with data provided in 
their native format such as in a spreadsheet with columns and rows. This leaves the data open 
to misuse, almost inviting the user to apply the data in other ways, (possibly even sinister), 
such as for: 
- Competitive intelligence; 
- Reselling; 
- Fraud; 
- Inferences and data mining; and 
- Organised crime. 
More specific to this thesis is the ability to profile critical infrastructure thereby 
compromising the CIP process, through any of the abovementioned activities. 
 
To reinforce the inadequacy of existing public data security mechanisms, the 
following discussion on data manipulation techniques is presented, illustrating the manner 
and ease with which public data can be manipulated with no preventative measures in place. 
More specifically, the encountered security techniques can do little to remove the capability 
of manipulating/presenting data for one’s own purposes. 
 
5.7 Data Manipulation/Presentation Techniques 
Data manipulation/presentation techniques, in this instance, refer to the 
transformation of the raw data collected into an alternate form, consequently highlighting the 
possible uses of public data concerning Australia’s CI. A key point is that the data is 
originally in an unstructured form, whether it is physical and/or electronic in nature. 
However, with the use of various tools, varying in complexity and information technology 
knowledge required, the data can be shaped into a more valuable asset specific to CI. Thus, 
the information can be employed for secondary purposes, ulterior to the purposes originally 
intended. This chapter has introduced the available security techniques; none of which can 
prohibit public data manipulation. This section aims to demonstrate the existing ability to 
alter data from its original form, allowing for scenarios to be established, which reinforces the 
threat to CI, and the CIP process. 
 
Manipulation/Presentation techniques refer to any tools or methods that can be 
employed to alter the form of public data. The techniques identified are adapted from an 
article focused on information analysis tools for counter terrorism, and are intended to be used 
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constructively to counteract the terrorist threat. Popp et al., (2004) discuss the importance of 
utilising information technology tools in counter-terrorism efforts. The main theme in the 
article is that if information was located and shared more readily by intelligence agencies, it 
could assist in anticipating potentially detrimental events and allow the agencies to be better 
equipped to avoid them. A number of intelligence or information analysis tools and 
techniques are described such as categorisation, clustering, database processing, geospatial 
information exploitation, information management and filtering, and visualisation.  
“Ultimately, such tools will create a seamless environment where 
analysts and decision- and policymakers can come together to 
collaborate, translate, find, link, evaluate, share, analyse, and act on 
the right information faster than ever before…” (Popp et al., 2004, p. 
43). 
 
However, the same tools can be applied for alternative and potentially destructive 
purposes, for use by terrorists for instance. It is therefore vital to consider the alternative 
perspective by taking a ‘counter counter-terrorism’ approach. That is, the same information 
analysis techniques can be used for negative purposes, to create inference about CI using 
publicly available data. This thesis proposes that the perspective be carefully considered as 
the tools and techniques used by intelligence agencies and Governments for national security 
purposes, can potentially be imitated by others for harmless, positive but also for destructive 
reasons. 
 
To demonstrate this concept in greater detail a ‘data manipulation/presentation’ 
scenario has been created to illustrate how data may be handled from its physical/raw form 
through to a geographic context using geospatial information exploitation. The categories of 
this process (displayed in Figure 5.6) have been adapted from Popp et al.’s (2004) counter 
terrorism categories. A number of additional techniques have been added to those presented 
in the article to ensure that they are more applicable to this analysis. That is, the categories are 
intended to depict a logical structure or flow.  
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Figure 5.6 The Manipulation/Presentation Process 
 
The process does not necessarily follow a linear flow, but rather the 
manipulation/presentation techniques can be used individually (in any order) or in parallel 
depending on the type of analysis and the level of sophistication required. The structure or 
flow is important to locate where a specific tool lies with respect to its complexity level and 
geospatial context. In this instance, the most sophisticated form of analysis is geospatial 
information exploitation, where data can be tied to a geographic position using an information 
system. The underlying factor in this discussion is that all methods are intended to ensure the 
raw data collected in chapter 4 are more significant and applicable to Australia’s CI. The 
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techniques are easily achieved, as the tools are readily available in off-the-shelf software. 
Each technique is described and discussed in detail with corresponding examples and/or 
illustrations. 
 
Each phase of the manipulation process is defined in Table 5.2, including the manner 
in which the techniques can be applied to the data collected in the previous chapter. This is 
valuable as it depicts the various scenarios that can be formed using publicly available data.  
 
Table 5.2 Manipulation/Presentation Technique Definitions 
Technique Definition What can be done using 
chapter 4 data? 
Physical data Unstructured real-word data that is 
tangible, and cannot be extensively 
manipulated. However, meaning 
can be extracted from the data 
(documents, pictures, videos and 
statistics) 
- Using the tangible 
points of interest map 
can be used to locate, 
and create a list of the 
most prominent 
infrastructure in the area 
Digitisation The process of converting physical 
public data to an electronic format 
- Scanning the tangible 
points of interest map as 
an image 
- Entering the list of 
critical infrastructure into 
a spreadsheet ready for 





Collecting, storing, displaying, 
analysing, categorising, clustering 
and managing electronic data 
- Using data of disparate 
forms to collate data by 
CI type, thereby creating 
a repository of CI (refer 
to Figures 5.7, 5.8 and 
5.9) 
Visualisation The process of determining 
relationships or associations 
between data elements, and mining 
for hidden patterns 
- Defining the 
interdependencies 
between CI types, 
visually creating a CI 
network highlighting 
important dependencies 
- Mining the disparate 
public data files to create 




Associating public data to a spatial 
context, and performing analysis 
using tools such as a GPS system, a 
GIS and spreadsheet software 
- Using the longitude and 
latitude coordinates 
readily available, map 
Australia’s CI and layer 
related information 
 
For demonstrative purposes, the technique of electronic data management and 
processing has been attempted (at a basic level) to illustrate how the public data collected in 
chapter 4 can be collated, which immediately establishes added meaning to the data. This 
technique is illustrated through the creation of a number of collages (Figure 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9), 
which use information from different data supplying agencies to cluster the data by CI type. 
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Although this process is simple, there exists the opportunity to assign more meaning to the 
data, for instance by utilising visualisation, and geospatial information exploitation 
techniques. The techniques can be executed on data of various forms including audio, motion 
and images, all of which can potentially be amalgamated into a geographic information 
system.  With such tools, there is the opportunity for individuals/groups with negative 
intentions to increase the level of detail by manipulating and processing public data from 
disparate sources. This reality supports the need to consider, revisit and revise the public data 
situation in Australia. 
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Critical Infrastructure: Utilities (Electricity, Gas, Water, Sewage)
 
Figure 5.7 Collage: The Basic Processing of Utilities Data 
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Figure 5.8 Collage: The Basic Processing of Transport Data 
 
The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and the Level of 
Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australia 
 





Figure 5.9 Collage: The Processing of Defence Data 
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This chapter has examined the security mechanisms presently used to govern public 
data access in Australia. It is apparent from the content analysis that security-related 
documentation does not prevent data from being manipulated using various techniques, 
including methods as simple as physical data presentation, to the increasingly complex 
geospatial information exploitation. This is primarily due to the fact that while documents are 
available to specify the manner in which data can be accessed and used, very little is done to 
enforce the mechanisms in a real-world setting. An adaptable Public Data Protection 
Lifecycle was presented as a means of minimising the threat of public data availability in 
Australia, by subscribing to a structured approach commencing with the identification of the 
context and sensitivity of the data, through to the enforcement, monitoring and reviewing 
stages. This process highlights the areas in which current data supplying agencies are lacking, 
and identifies the structure that must be adopted by all bodies to manage the public data 
availability situation in the country. The phases of the Public Data Protection Lifecycle 
require further consideration for a set of realistic recommendations to be suggested, which 
will assist in consolidating the proposed lifecycle. A survey of security experts involved in 
CIP research will assist in accomplishing this task; the results of the survey are discussed in 
chapter 6. 
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Public Data & The Security Expert Community in Australia 
 
6.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to gauge the attitudes of security experts in Australia 
with regards to the public data availability dilemma. The outcomes of chapters 4 and 5 have 
provoked the need for addressing the censorship versus open access debate concerning public 
data, and to consider in greater detail the individual stages of the proposed Public Data 
Protection Lifecycle. A qualitative survey was distributed to a group of individuals considered 
experts in CIP-related research within Australia. Due to the vast and unstructured nature of 
public data availability, many components and aspects of the protecting public data must be 
considered and a multi-faceted security solution must be devised. The solution is based on the 
outcomes of the survey, where there is the need to evaluate alternative security mechanisms to 
the written documentation, discuss the perceived effectiveness of licence agreements, and 
determine a possible restriction process (through the use of a stakeholder matrix). The 
solution components must complement and strengthen the Public Data Protection Lifecycle 
presented in chapter 5. This chapter will provide realistic and achievable goals targeted 
primarily at the Government (at all levels) sector, but can also be applied by other data 
supplying agencies.  
 
6.2 Critical Infrastructure Protection Survey 
The Critical Infrastructure Protection Survey (see Appendix A) was distributed in 
hardcopy, at the National Security Technology Conference (21st September, 2006) and also 
subsequently online. The primary objective of this survey was to discuss issues relating to 
public data availability in Australia. Of great importance was to determine and gain an 
appreciation of the public data availability situation, as perceived by security experts. A key 
factor was to provide an outlet for security experts, researchers and interested parties who are 
knowledgeable about CIP to communicate their concerns and attitudes, and assist in providing 
suggestions to solve the public data availability dilemma. The required solution must offer 
equal benefits to the four distinct community member groups or stakeholders, so as to ensure 
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that a particular stakeholder is not disadvantaged in terms of public data access. The 
Stakeholders include: 
1. Australian Government bodies; 
2. Operators of critical infrastructure; 
3. Educational institutions and research networks; and 
4. General public (citizens). 
 
6.2.1 The Profile of Survey Respondents 
The qualitative survey yielded 21 security expert responses, almost half of which 
came from individuals employed by the Government sector, as shown in Figure 6.1 
(displaying basic demographic details, not to be confused with statistical or quantitative 
analyses). With respect to the response rate, the survey was primarily focused on qualitative 
responses to further support the development of the Public Data Protection Lifecycle. It must 
be emphasised that the number of responses received was not a limiting factor to the study. 
Additionally, the solution proposed must be customised and adapted to each organisation 
before being implemented, which requires extended research into the needs of the diverse 



























Figure 6.1 Industry Types of Survey Respondents 
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The collective profile of survey respondents reveals a heavy reliance on the use of 
free public data, or a combination of both free and purchased data. An interesting observation 
is that not one individual (organisation) depended solely on purchased public data; a majority 
of the respondents found that free public data is also beneficial for their purposes (Figure 6.2). 
 







Free & Purchased Data




Figure 6.2 Types of CI-Related Public Data Used by Respondents 
 
In terms of day-to-day uses of critical infrastructure data, over half the respondents 
utilise public data to conduct risk assessment/risk management activities. Additional uses 
include: 
•  Government intelligence purposes; 
•  Business intelligence purposes; 
•  Service provisioning; 
•  Customer Relationship Management (CRM); 
•  Navigation; 
•  Construction; 
•  Supporting response agencies with geospatial information; and 
•  Research (tertiary education) purposes.  
The security experts rely on a variety of agencies for collecting public data to support such 
tasks, most notably the data supplying agencies identified in chapter 4.  
 
The overall profile of the respondents revealed that the group is knowledgeable 
concerning public data use, and that the data is beneficial for accomplishing daily tasks. It is 
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crucial to determine the perceived benefits and concerns of public data availability in 
Australia as professed by the experts, prior to working towards a solution and reaching a 
balance between restricting data from the public domain and openly providing access. 
 
6.3 The Benefits and Concerns of Public Data Availability 
Security experts reinforce the need for a balance between data accessibility and 
restricting access to data. The survey responses generally indicate that the difficulty in this 
situation stems from the fact that public data availability can present both positive and 
negative consequences, depending on how it is applied.  
 
Security experts felt that the benefits accruing from public data availability include 
promoting community trust, allowing immediate responses in time-critical situations, and 
assisting in the completion of daily tasks in specific occupations. The use of public data for 
such applications is crucial; therefore, the security experts generally maintained that it would 
be unwise to restrict access to the relevant datasets in such situations. The major benefits are 
further discussed.  
 
6.3.1 Fostering an Informed and Open Society Based on Trust 
A number of security experts felt that community members have a basic right to 
access information concerning their surroundings and community. According to a respondent 
in the Government sector, encouraging the concealment of basic community data and 
enacting harsh restrictions will inevitably result in Australia becoming a “secretive, scared 
society”, which is a disagreeable effect. An additional point raised was that CI-related data 
should be publicly accessible “to ensure that governments and infrastructure providers are not 
relying on security through obscurity.” Trust is an imperative factor in this situation, 
particularly in view of sustaining a positive relationship and level of transparency between the 
Australian Government and citizens. 
 
6.3.2 Facilitating Timely Responses and Data Exchange 
Certain applications, such as emergency management, rely on the transfer and 
exchange of CI-related data in a timely fashion. A common notion expressed in the survey is 
that in such applications, direct data access is essential. Public data can therefore aid with 
activities including continuity planning, evacuation, infrastructure protection, and emergency 
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management for incidents, such as earthquakes, cyclones, tsunamis, bushfires, infrastructure 
disruptions, and terrorist attacks. 
 
6.3.3 Assisting in Performing Daily Tasks 
The survey revealed that the majority of respondents rely on public data in their 
respective industries to accomplish daily tasks. Public data access is beneficial in these 
situations, and increases safety in particular occupations. For instance, a security expert in the 
construction industry maintained, “as a structural engineer, information such as ground levels, 
location of buildings, location of electricity, water, gas, etc is critical to the safe design of 
buildings and infrastructure.” Therefore, access to relevant CI-data, regardless of sensitivity is 
required. 
 
Despite these positive aspects, the situation is complicated due to the potentially 
devastating implications of public data availability, which encourages that the issue of data 
restriction be considered in order to minimise the existing threats. The concerns relating to 
public data availability include impacting on national security efforts (and therefore CIP), 
facilitating other forms of misuse, and affecting the privacy and confidentiality of individuals. 
These concerns are further explained.  
 
6.3.4 Hindering Infrastructure and National Security Campaigns 
The major concern identified regarding public data availability was the potentially 
damaging effects on national security and CIP programs, more specifically the use of public 
data for aiding in terrorist-related activities. As a survey respondent noted “access to data 
should be well-controlled to minimise the possibility of use by foreign and domestic 
adversaries”. This thought is shared by other experts, one of which claims “if potential 
terrorists can access good quality data over the Internet, this can eliminate the need for on-site 
reconnaissance, which in turn eliminates the opportunity for the behaviour to be noticed, 
investigated, and attacks disrupted.” Disregarding this concern can result in widespread and 
immeasurable physical and psychological consequences. 
 
6.3.5 Facilitating Other Forms of Misuse 
The concerns associated with public data availability are not limited to terrorist-
related activities. Security experts expressed that CI-related public data can aid other forms of 
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misuse and offences, with consequences such as increased crime, services disruption, 
vandalism, identity theft/fraud and obtrusive telemarketing. 
 
6.3.6 Compromising Privacy and Confidentiality 
Privacy and confidentiality are key concerns in this discussion. While the data of 
interest to the research is CI-related, a number of respondents felt that personal privacy is an 
additional concern, which also introduces the personal safety dimension to the study.  
 
Therefore, public data availability presents positive and negative implications, 
although a Government official responded that open access to data results in “CONCERNS 
ONLY”. Similarly, a respondent in the education industry claimed that there were “no major 
benefits”, as the positive aspects of public data availability are somewhat overshadowed by 
the potentially devastating damage. However, the majority of respondents feel that strict 
censorship and data restriction is not a viable option. A common thread in the survey is that 
information should be available on a “need-to-know basis”, to the appropriate personnel who 
require the data for carrying out tasks that are advantageous in some way. That is, “the 
TRADE-OFF between what one needs to have to do their work well, and what needs to be 
kept sensitive because it may be used against a nation” must be managed. This is based on the 
concept that data should not be made available for individuals with no “legitimate” purpose to 
access it. Legitimate in this instance refers to whether an individual can justify that the data 
accessed will be used positively. A possible solution to this dilemma is recommended, as is an 
attempt to find an appropriate and realistic balance.  
 
6.4 Achieving the Balance: the Public Data Availability Solution 
A notable outcome of the survey is that data should only be accessed for “legitimate” 
reasons. While in theory, this argument is seemingly valid and rational, in practice it is 
difficult to accomplish. For instance, a number of important questions emerge that require 
further thought, and answering: 
1. What CI-related data elements will be available to certain individuals? 
2. What conditions define a “legitimate” purpose? 
3. How will the process as a whole be enforced? 
A practical solution must be put forward, providing practical answers to these questions. 
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The first question may be addressed through the use of a stakeholder matrix 
(introduced in section 6.4.1), where a sensitivity based grading system can be employed to 
determine the data elements that should be available to certain stakeholders.  
 
In terms of setting out the conditions to define what constitutes a “legitimate” 
purpose, public data protection attempts become more difficult, as the notion of legitimacy 
can be subject to interpretation. That is, it is difficult for individuals to justify positive uses of 
data. A possible approach in situations where sensitive information is required involves the 
data supplier assuming customised approach to granting access, whereby access to certain 
datasets must be granted on a personal basis after careful consideration. 
 
Finally, the issue of enforcing or policing public data access is difficult, and as the 
previous chapter indicated, is often ignored (with respect to written documentation). The 
responsibility of enforcing public data access would lie with the data supplying body, but also 
with the individual who was granted access to the data. Regular checks are required to control 
this situation, and further research into policing public data access is essential. 
 
Addressing these questions evidently requires the development of a multi-faceted 
approach focused on the proposed Public Data Protection Lifecycle. This solution is 
composed of a number of core elements that can be interweaved, and act in a complementary 
capacity to the lifecycle. The components include: 
1. Stakeholder matrix for determining the sensitivity of CI data elements; 
2. The improvement of non-technical security mechanisms; and 
3. The introduction of technical security tools where appropriate, in order to compliment 
and support the abovementioned components.  
 
6.4.1 The Stakeholder Matrix 
The Stakeholder matrix provides a sensitivity-based grading system that determines 
the relative sensitivity of CI data elements, and recommends who should be granted access to 
that particular element. The underlying concept behind the stakeholder matrix is to clearly 
outline the three grades that can be assigned to a data element: 
1. Unclassified/public: a data element that can be accessed by any individual; 
2. Restricted: a data element that can be accessed by a specific user group or 
stakeholder; and 
3. Classified/private: a data element that cannot be publicly accessed. 
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The recommendation with respect to this matrix is that it be used by data supplying 
agencies and bodies to decide which data elements may require censorship or restricted 
access. A sample matrix, based on the findings of the survey, is provided in Figure 6.3. The 
diagram depicts a possible classification system to be used as the foundation of the proposed 
public data availability solution, addressing the first stage of the lifecycle, which is to 
‘Establish context of public data and relative sensitivity’. In its present form, the matrix can 
be used as a guideline; however, it is suggested that an expanded matrix be devised 
containing a comprehensive list of CI-related data elements and a similar analysis be 
performed. The grade assigned to each specific data element is based on whether security 
experts felt that the particular element should be available to the respective stakeholder. For 
example: 
•  If more than 66 percent of security experts felt a data element should be 
available, an ‘unclassified’ grade is assigned; 
•  If between 33 to 66 percent of security experts believe a data element should be 
available, a ‘restricted’ grade is assigned; and 
•  If less than 33 percent of security experts believe it should be available, a 











Major Defence Sites 100 58 32 16
Telecom Exchanges 100 89 50 17
Sewage Outfalls 100 95 68 53
Banks (Financial Hubs) 89 74 47 32
Schools 100 79 84 79
Cultural Icons 84 53 74 74
Gas Pipelines 100 79 42 32
Shopping Malls 84 89 68 84
Dams 100 79 47 37
Hospitals 100 84 63 74
Places of Worship 83 67 67 89
Electricity Grids 94 83 58 17
Classified Restricted UnclassifiedKey:
 
Figure 6.3 Data Sensitivity Stakeholder Matrix 
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The Stakeholder Matrix is a fundamental concept that will form the basis or 
foundation of any public data protection campaign, and is currently a missing element from 
the censorship versus open access debate. It is important that the matrix be supported by 
additional security mechanisms, both non-technical and technical in nature. 
 
6.4.2 Non-Technical Security Mechanisms 
Non-technical security mechanisms refer to public data protection tools that do not 
require the use of technology to be accomplished. Defining non-technical security techniques 
covers a fragment of the third stage of the Public Data Protection Lifecycle.  
 
Survey respondents feel that non-technical security techniques can be beneficial in 
public data protection initiatives, the most appropriate being: 
•  Legal and licence agreement containing conditions of use, defining the owner of 
the data elements and “WHO” will enforce the agreement 
•  Legislations, regulations and penalties, such as fines for breach of legislation or 
for inappropriate use 
•  Unambiguous policies and guidelines, accessible by the public 
•  Developing a register of approved users, and defining how they may use data. A 
suggestion was the use of “access control matrices”, auditing and classification 
•  Communicating frequently with users about their rights and responsibilities with 
respect to data use. Educating users is particularly important; “Educate staff in 
government agencies about how data can be used, and what tabs governments are 
keeping. E.g. internal audit systems that run on intrusion detection systems might 
keep logs of all transactions to do with spatial and statistical data” 
•  Limiting sharing between departments and agencies, particularly within the 
Government sector, as it is not possible to distribute data and be sure that the data 
will be used appropriately 
•  Introducing physical security on assets to ensure correct storage, and prevent 
illegitimate physical access of data 
•  Encouraging a coordinated ‘whole-of-Government’ approach to data protection 
•  Prohibiting companies from selling data, which is an extreme option and is not 
realistic given the nature of the commercial data sector  
•  Using “common sense” 
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Written documentation in the form of licence agreements is a key non-technical 
measure. Chapter 5 demonstrated the flaws in written documentation; the most stringent form 
of written documentation was the licence agreement. However, the agreement was flawed in 
terms of its contents, but particularly with respect to the lack of enforcement procedures. 
When asked whether licence agreements have a part to play in public in the distribution and 
use of critical infrastructure data, a majority of security experts responded that licence 
agreements, if properly executed, could be definitely beneficial (refer to Figure 6.4). Security 
experts generally felt that licence agreements are the initial point of contact with users, and 
that without them “there are no boundaries, and unfortunately no one can be trusted.” 
However, it was argued that licences should ideally be provided by sector, and some form of 
policing strategy must be introduced which is difficult given that free data is becoming 
increasingly detailed. 





















Figure 6.4 Do Licence Agreements Have a Part to Play? 
 
As maintained by the security experts, licence agreements should ideally contain 
information relating to: 
•  Laws and legal information detailing and governing use an disclosure of data 
•  Conditions of use, including clear definition of restrictions, distribution 
limitations, responsibility and accountability information, consequences of 
unauthorised release and misuse 
•  Statement/advice of other parties who have access to the data 
•  Storage requirements, commercial aspects such as payment details 
•  Correct acknowledgement of source, vintage and “fixed term so as to ensure 
reviews are conducted regularly” 
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•  Accompanied by privacy and confidentiality policies, and disclaimers 
•  Consideration of the sensitivity of data, as “there should be a rigorous and open 
process for classifying sensitive data” 
•  Providing a distinction between stakeholder groups, for instance “educational 
institutions and citizens need to show legitimate claim to why they need CI data”. 
Also, a strict code of conduct for Government agencies regarding licencing is 
required, for instance “that the data can only be used by a given person for a 
given project and that each requires a certain level of clearance depending on the 
context”  
 
Despite these considerations, licence agreements cannot be too strict that they 
prohibit people from conducting their work. A number of respondents believe that what 
currently exists in licence agreements should be retained, whilst others believe it is difficult to 
generalise licence agreements and that the existing agreements must be revised. As pointed 
out by a number of respondents, defining an enforceable strategy is crucial to the success of 
licence agreements. This reinforces the findings and suggestions of chapter 5; “the point is 
WHO will police the licencing?” Therefore, it is apparent that licence agreements have a part 
to play in public data protection; however, they must be reinforced by additional mechanisms 
such as technology-based techniques as they are limited in their present state.  
 
6.4.3 Technical Security Mechanisms 
Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs) facilitate access to public data 
through the Internet, and consequently are at the centre of the public data availability 
dilemma. However, there is the potential to supplement the above-mentioned security 
techniques with technical measures in certain situations, and use ICT to assist in protecting 
and restricting access to sensitive datasets. This component assists in addressing stage three of 
the Public Data Protection Lifecycle.  
 
According to the surveyed security experts, technical security mechanisms may 
include: 
•  Secure networks not displayed to the public on networks and the Internet, 
containing regular and real time encryption, logging, auditing, standard protection 
from damage (firewalls, intrusion detection systems) and appropriate filters 
•  Access control, and password protection, requiring identity checks to be 
performed for more sensitive data, such as defence information 
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•  Security clearance for access to sensitive data, including providing proof of 
identity and justification in terms of data use 
•  “Deliberately non-integrated systems” 
•  “Central storage and distributed access” 
•  Review and update of security techniques, and measuring their effectiveness 
 
Such techniques, as with the non-technical measures, must be enforced and managed 
adequately, and must be intertwined with the Public Data Protection Lifecycle which 
encompasses the Stakeholder Matrix.  
 
6.5 Discussion 
 The proposed solution (Figure 6.5) demonstrated two components of the Public Data 
Protection Lifecycle in detail. However, it is apparent that additional research must be 
conducted into the remaining lifecycle stages, in particular stage six that involves monitoring 
and enforcing the data protection mechanisms in place. The stages of the lifecycle will vary 
depending on the department, the type of data elements available and the stakeholders. 
Therefore, a standard lifecycle cannot be presented. It is recommended that the stages of the 
lifecycle be adhered to, but that the specific details contained within each stage are tailored to 
each department.  
 
 A key outcome of survey is that the situation may be interpreted in many ways, and 
one solution alone (for example, a technical solution) cannot be employed. Rather, there is the 
need for a responsive solution that targets specific stakeholders, and is concerned with the 
sensitivity of public data in terms of compromising the CIP process, and protecting individual 
CI elements. However, despite the multi-phased solution provided by the Public Data 
Protection Lifecycle, it is important to note that the approach is not infallible. 
 
 An important point raised by a respondent that must be discussed at this stage is that 
perhaps the public data availability dilemma is being approached from an incorrect angle, that 
we should not address the issue only in terms of the mechanisms that can be implemented. 
Rather, it may be “about facing the root problems of terrorism, and addressing them.” 
Extending this point beyond the terrorist threat, it may be valuable to address other adverse 
issues such as vandalism, fraud and competitive intelligence, and engage in why such 
activities take place and attempt to limit this. This requires further study, and is beyond the 
scope of this study. 
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Figure 6.5 Detailed Solution Based on the Public Data Protection Lifecycle 
 
When considering the proposed lifecycle in terms of critical infrastructure protection 
it is important to note that it is one aspect of a broader solution. As stated by a security expert, 
“a government cannot hope to achieve a comprehensive approach to critical infrastructure 
protection if they are giving away data about their own infrastructure. It does not make it 
difficult for terrorists to obtain the data… As terrorists become more aware of not only spatial 
data availability, and ways to use this data in well-defined processes, many problems will 
arise.” Providing a wealth of CI-related data online can result in unscrupulous individuals 
conducting their own risk assessments, defining areas where the greatest losses will occur, 
and easily identifying the location of the CI elements. However, censorship is not the answer. 
As demonstrated in this chapter, a balance is crucial and many elements such as employing a 
structured approach, and determining the root cause of detrimental activities that can be 
carried out using public data, is essential.  
 
6.6 Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the findings of the survey of security experts involved in 
CIP research in Australia. The public data availability situation was discussed in terms of the 
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concerns and benefits, and the need for a balance between censorship and open data access 
was reinforced. The outcomes of the survey resulted in the development of a sensitivity based 
Stakeholder matrix for classifying public data, and a definition of the appropriate non-
technical and technical security techniques that can be utilised. The three components may 
easily be interweaved into the proposed Public Data Protection Lifecycle, demonstrating the 
adaptability of this structured solution. While the lifecycle provides more structure to the 
process, it is apparent that it cannot solely prohibit the misuse of public data for comprising 
the CIP process. However, it does indicate that the current techniques for protecting public 
data must be revised. Chapter 7 will stipulate in greater detail the specific outcomes of this 
research, and provide future direction for study, and to the data supplying agencies. 
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7.1 Research Summary 
The purpose of this study was to determine and understand the threat or risk of public 
data availability on Australia’s critical infrastructure (CI), and the critical infrastructure 
protection (CIP) process. A review of CI, CIP and public data availability literature was 
conducted, which revealed the need for an Australian-based study on public data availability. 
The importance of examining the balance between data censorship and data access in the 
interest of national security was a prominent issue. Based on the literature review outcomes, it 
was evident that this research required that data suppliers be defined and located, that CI data 
be collected from the supplying agencies and that the security mechanisms encountered be 
evaluated to verify whether public data availability was indeed a threat in Australia. By 
focussing on the awareness levels and opinions of security experts in Australia, a 
collaborative approach to establishing a solution to the data censorship versus open access 
debate was possible.  
 
The research results include the development of a comprehensive, sector-based 
review of Australia’s data supplying agencies and a critical infrastructure repository of 
publicly available CI data (refer to ‘CI Data Repository’ CD). A structured approach to 
protecting public data from potential misuse was offered through the Public Data Protection 
Lifecycle, and various stages of the lifecycle were strengthened through the outcomes of the 
qualitative survey of security experts. The significant findings of the research are discussed. 
 
 7.2 Significant Findings  
This research has resulted in a number of clear outcomes relating to the nature of the 
public data availability situation in Australia. The significant findings are discussed, 
identifying the aims and objectives satisfied by each outcome. The specific aims of this 
project are: 
1. To identify the data supplying agencies across Australia; 
2. To collect public data from the identified agencies; 
3. To gather and record details on the security mechanisms encountered in the data 
collection process; 
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4. To perform a content analysis on any written security-related documents; 
5. To display the possible methods of data manipulation; and 
6. To assess the level of awareness, and opinions of security experts. 
 
7.2.1 Outcome 1: A Data Repository of Australia’s CI 
This outcome addressed objectives 1 and 2 of the study. The specific result was that it 
is possible to simply engage in the creation of a comprehensive, sector-based repository of 
Australia’s CI. The Australian Government, through related Federal and State departments, 
offers a wealth of free data for public access. Other data supplying agencies are also present, 
such as commercial agencies and utility companies, who provide data both for profit and 
indirectly. The public data collected from disparate sources, and in multiple formats can be 
incorporated into the repository, and be stored for any purpose.  
 
The data repository created, which was not exhaustive, demonstrated that revealing 
information can be extracted concerning Australia’s CI. While for research and emergency 
management purposes this is important, a number of negative implications introduce the 
question of whether the positive uses of public data are overshadowed in certain situations. 
The potentially damaging effects of public data availability revolve around simplifying the 
ability to collect information that can compromise Australia’s CI, and therefore the CIP 
process. Such activities include terrorism, fraud, identity theft, vandalism, and competitive 
intelligence. 
 
7.2.2 Outcome 2: ‘Sensitive but Unclassified’ Data Exists in Australia 
Outcome 2 fulfils objective 5 of the research. The ability to manipulate/present data 
in a form different from its original has demonstrated that ‘sensitive but unclassified’ data is 
in abundance in Australia. Data elements independently appear harmless, but techniques 
ranging in complexity and sophistication, such as geospatial information exploitation allow 
for inferences to be made, and patterns to be extracted concerning Australia’s CI, thus posing 
a threat to the CIP process. An important note is that sensitive but unclassified data can be 
manipulated or modified easily, and existing security mechanisms (primarily written 
documentation) cannot prevent such activities. An additional aspect of this outcome is the 
importance of the spatial context and mapping of CI. The importance of geography and the 
spatial context was alluded to through this research, and is an area for further study. This 
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claim is based on the argument that anything can be tied to a geographic location, and entered 
into a geographic information system (GIS). 
 
7.2.3 Outcome 3: Current Written Security Mechanisms (Documentation) 
Should be Revised 
This outcome satisfies objectives 3 and 4 of the research. Present written 
documentation aimed at governing the use of public data, Internet and Government resources 
are inadequate, as they prevent data misuse, are generally disregarded, and have no evident 
consequences. A contributing factor to their shortfall is that enforcement of such documents 
does not exist. Additionally, the contents of the documents must be strengthened, to follow 
the Office of Spatial Data Management model. This model is a superior indicator of how 
licencing of public data should work; however, there is the added need to extend this model 
into an enforced licencing scheme, which will form one component of public data protection. 
A key consideration is that written documentation cannot independently offer protection 
against public data misuse.  
  
7.2.4 Outcome 4: The Importance of a Collaborative Approach to Public 
Data Protection 
This outcome is related to objectives 4 and 5, but specifically satisfies objective 6. It 
is clear that the security expert community is knowledgeable about the public data availability 
dilemma. That is, many of the surveyed individuals subscribe to the view that providing open 
access to data can be detrimental to Australia’s CI, but that restriction or censorship alone is 
not an appropriate solution. Survey respondents expressed the notion of a ‘balance’, and a 
collaborative solution was presented based on: 
1. Risk management literature, resulting in the development of a Public Data Protection 
Lifecycle which provides a structure, multi-phased approach to safeguarding public 
data from misuse; and 
2. Security expert survey responses, resulting in the development of a sensitivity-based 
matrix, which aims at providing a way of classifying public data and restricting 
access of certain datasets to specific stakeholders. Additionally, survey responses 
reinforce various lifecycle phases, suggesting improvements to licence agreements  
(the most stringent form of existing security mechanism), and introducing technical 
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and non-technical security mechanisms to be incorporated into the lifecycle, such as 
password-based access and enforcement of licence agreements and legal documents.   
 
7.3 Links to Earlier Findings 
This study was initially inspired by Breeding (2003), who conducted a similar 
assessment on America’s critical services. The outcomes of Breeding’s research indicated that 
openly available information concerning America’s critical infrastructure could prove 
damaging, in that they allow inferences to be made, which could consequently compromise 
any protection efforts by providing valuable details relating to the weak points and 
interdependencies between infrastructure items. It was therefore important to shift the study to 
an Australian setting, and evaluate the national threat, suggest possible areas for 
improvement, and work towards a solution that could be practically implemented by data 
supplying bodies. 
 
The general outcomes of this study were aligned with Breeding’s, highlighting the 
potentially negative consequences enabled, and to an extent facilitated by the provision of 
public data relating to Australia’s CI. An additional element of surveying security experts 
added value to the study in terms of allowing an initial collaborative approach to reaching a 
balance between restriction and open access to be employed. The outcomes of this research 
are particularly relevant to the Government sector, specifically in an era where the e-
Government movement is gaining traction and popularity in Australian, resulting in a wealth 
of data being published online to encourage openness between the Government and its 
people. 
 
7.4 Research Contribution 
The contribution of this research has been to the fields of CIP and public data 
availability, and the study is particularly applicable to data supplying agencies in Australia. 
The research has gained recognition and interest from various Australian agencies such as the 
Department of Defence, the Department of Transport and Regional Services and the 
Australian Institute of Criminology, in addition to a number of research institutions. This is 
based on the fact that the research has defined the threat of public data availability, and the 
important steps and possible approaches of minimising the risk associated with open access. 
The recommendations offered are practical, and can be applied to and adapted by any data 
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supplier. The chief contribution is the multi-phased Public Data Protection Lifecycle, which 
can be developed into a structured approach adopted across the entire data supplier sector.  
 
7.5 Recommendations and Further Research 
This research has presented areas for further study, in addition to the need for action 
to be taken based on the identified outcomes and conclusions. The study was centred on 
providing a complete and comprehensive view of the public data availability situation in 
Australia; the research was not exhaustive in certain areas. Thus the research can be extended 
in a number of ways, as complimentary areas for study have emerged. This research can be 
extended in its present form in Australia, and may also be replicated in its entirety 
internationally using the devised methodology. The opportunity for further study exists in a 
number of fields. 
 
The need for an exhaustive sector-based public data availability study is a primary 
area for further research, particularly within the Government sector to assess the CI-related 
public data available, and classify the data accordingly. This is related to revisiting the issue 
of censorship and restriction; the attempt to find a balance was introduced using the 
sensitivity-based matrix, however, this matrix can be refined and extended across the 
identified data supplier sectors.  
 
Similarly, the Public Data Protection Lifecycle was provided as the foundation of a 
structured approached for safeguarding publicly available data in an attempt to prevent 
misuse. The lifecycle phases were not expressed in terms of the specific details and sub-
stages. Research into the lifecycle, and a structured approach is required, as is a strategy that 
can be tested in multiple sectors and can be adapted to the needs of the diverse data supplying 
agencies. Each stage of the lifecycle can be built upon and revised in future studies.  
 
As was alluded to throughout this research, the spatial context is significant with 
respect to CI and CIP. With the prominence of mapping tools and Geographic Information 
Systems for CIP-related activities, spatial studies relating specifically to public data 
availability are important areas. Viewing the public data availability situation from a spatial 
context involves all public data elements collected to be associated to a geographic location, 
and provides a sophisticated method of displaying and manipulating public data.  
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Finally, this research has highlighted the need for improvements to the CIP process. 
This would involve incorporating public data availability as a threat to CIP efforts, 
recognising the need for mitigation strategies and establishing and enforcing the strategies. 
This is closely tied to studies concerning the Public Data Protection Lifecycle, and evaluating 
the structured approach to managing the public data availability situation.  
 
Any combination of the above areas provides an alternative viewpoint of CIP, and 
would aid greatly in a practical setting, particularly by assisting data supplying agencies to 
manage the public data they possess in an effective manner. 
 
7.6 Conclusion 
Breeding (2003) recognised that public data availability posed a threat to the CIP 
process in America, as data elements regardless of sensitivity were available for general 
access and use. A review of literature in topics such as censorship introduced added 
complexity to the situation. That is, a majority of public data is available and distributed using 
the Internet, and the inherent nature of the Internet makes it difficult for censorship to be 
enforced. Additionally, the concept of censorship implies mistrust and is restrictive, which is 
undesired given that public data is required in certain situations. The need for a balance 
between the two streams became apparent, resulting in an attempt to move towards this 
balance by conducting research into the existing public data availability situation in Australia, 
and determining the most appropriate approach for managing the situation. 
 
A structured approach to managing the vast amounts of CI-related public data is 
critical, as is the need for the adoption of this approach by all data supplying agencies 
countrywide. This method provides a sensitivity-based classification system, in order to grade 
CI public data elements, and provides a form of balance between censorship and open 
information access. The positive aspects of the presented lifecycle include its adaptability, 
flexibility, and applicability to data suppliers in disparate sectors. The lifecycle incorporates 
technical and non-technical security mechanisms, and introduces enforcement, documentation 
and review as important enablers of its success. Unless public data availability is considered a 
possible impediment to CIP efforts, and a structured approach of this nature is adopted, then 
Australia’s CI is at risk due to the availability of revealing data elements that allow for weak 
points to be determined. Data can be manipulated and misused to instigate harm to Australia’s 
CI, which will be difficult to recover from with potentially physical and psychological effects, 
as has been historically evident. 
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Critical infrastructure are the essential services that contribute to the stability 
and security of a country, and include energy, banking and finance, transport 
and distribution, utilities, health, the food supply and communications. This 
survey explores the benefits and costs of public data availability on critical 
infrastructure in Australia. The results will be used to inform Government 
policy with respect to public data.  
 
This survey is voluntary, and has received ethics clearance from the 
University of Wollongong. Filling out the survey should take approximately 10 
minutes to complete.  We value your feedback. 
 
If you have further questions or would like a copy of the completed thesis, 
please contact  on 




The Threat of Public Data Availability on Critical Infrastructure Protection (CIP), and the Level of 
Awareness Amongst Security Experts in Australia 
 




1. Please select your industry type 
□ Government   □  Consulting 
□ Education   □  Agriculture 
□ Property & Business  □  Other (please specify) _____________ 
 
 
2. Which data sources have you heard of? (please select all that apply) 
□ All of the following   □  Attorney General's Office 
□ GeoScience Australia   □  MapData Sciences 
□ G-NAF                    □  Sensis 
□ PSMA      □  Utility companies 
□ Salmat     □  TISN 
□ Dun and Bradstreet   □  MapInfo 
□  Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) □  AND/OR/Other (specify) _____________ 
 
 
3. Does your organisation use critical infrastructure related data?  
       □  Yes, Free Data         □  Yes, Commercial Data         □  Both         □  No 
 
 
4. If you use critical infrastructure data for day-to-day activities, what do you 
use it for? 
      □ For government intelligence purposes   
□ For business intelligence purposes  
□ To conduct risk assessment/risk management     
□ For service provisioning     
□ For telemarketing 
□ For Customer Relationship Management (CRM)    
□ For navigation    
□ Other (please specify) __________________________________________________
  
 
5. A Licence Agreement is a written document that sets out the conditions for 
using a particular resource (such as public data). Do you believe licence 
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7. The following matrix provides a list of publicly available data elements. For 
each stakeholder, indicate which data elements should be made available by 




















Major Defence Sites 
 □ □ □ □ 
Telecom Exchanges 
 □ □ □ □ 
Sewage Outfalls 




□ □ □ □ 
Schools 
 □ □ □ □ 
Cultural Icons 
 □ □ □ □ 
Gas Pipelines 
 □ □ □ □ 
Shopping Malls 
 □ □ □ □ 
Dams 
 □ □ □ □ 
Hospitals 
 □ □ □ □ 
Places of Worship 
 □ □ □ □ 
Electricity Grids 
 □ □ □ □ 
 
 
8. What INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY and NON-TECHNICAL measures do you 
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9. Do you believe anyone should be able to purchase critical infrastructure 







10. What do you feel are the major concerns and/or benefits related to public 
data availability? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
